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Studies on the dynamics of national system of innovati n (NSI) are still few and far 
between to become a significant theme for research based discourse in the Indian 
academic world2. Even the policymakers are not keen to engage as yet with the 
academics on the issues concerning the impact of ref rms on the national systems of 
innovation (NSI) in India. Some policymakers certainly have become active on the 
issue of getting the government to step up the public funds for scientific research in 
the publicly funded R&D system3. Otherwise mostly discussions among the Indian 
policymakers on the impact of reforms undertaken during the period of last two 
decades have been self-congratulatory4. An important academic task before the NSI 
community is therefore to get the policymaking world to engage with the concerns 
being raised by us on the post-reform achievements of NSI in India.  
 
This article undertakes the challenge of relating the emerging academic findings on 
the post-reform achievements and limitations of NSI to the earlier Indian academic 
discourse on liberalization with which the policymaking world had actively connected 
to obtain legitimacy for the policy of liberalization at the time of the start of reforms 
in the mid eighties. It brings out that currently the policymaking world appears to be 
discussing the achievements and limitations of the NSI by assuming implicitly as if 
the chosen route of reforms is essentially correct and needs only some corrections at 
the level of public funding in basic science, venture capital and other such measures 
to be taken up by the nation state in respect of science, technology and innovation 
(STI) to achieve the desired outcomes. Policymakers are going overboard with the 
achievement of just an average of six percent rate of economic growth5. The obvious 
limitations of a growth path in which the route of outsourcing is visibly the engine of 
                                               
1 NISTADS 
2 See the studies undertaken by the currently active academics: Rishikesh Krishnan (2001, 2004, 
2005)), Sunil Mani (2001, 2004, 2005), R. Basant (1999, 2002, 2004), K Joseph (2004), Sunil Mani 
and Nagesh Kumar (2002), V.V Krishna (2002), Ardhana Aggarwal (2004) and Dinesh Abrol (1997, 
1998, 1999, 2002, 2004) Most of these have been alrady presented in the Globelics meetings. 
3 Concerns raised by CN R Rao, N Balaram are of this nature and have been responded to by the 
government in a way by giving a higher level of support to the Indian Institute of Science and 
sanctioning one more science institute to be located near Kolkatta.  
4 In the Indian parliament discussions on the S&T budget are a rare occurrence. It is notorious for the 
guillotine being put on the S&T budget discussions. I  the party political circles, S&T debate is an 
exception. Consensus on the S&T priorities and outcomes is a rule. Even the latest programme of UPA 
government (NCMP) in respect of S&T is only a paragraph long. No questions and complete autonomy 
to the scientists and S&T institutions is the order of the day.   
5 First of all, they have suggested that the period of liberalization has to be divided into two phases. The 
rates of growth achieved during the phase of internal liberalization are no less when we compare them 
with the performance achieved during the phase of external liberalization.  They point out that the 
growth performance of the phase of internal liberalization with the period after 1990s the phase of 
external liberalization is yet to surpass the rates of growth achieved during the eighties. In a way 
through this argument on the rates of growth these academics are also questioning indirectly the claims 
being made about the proven nature or correctness as uch of the policies of external liberalization, 
privatization and global integration of the structures of science, technology and innovation.  
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growth does not seem to be bothering them much6. Concerns being raised on the 
patterns of growth composition, structure of demand including domestic demand size, 
incentives and institutions for the establishment of interactions and flow of knowledge 
among the firms and organizations and other such determinants of the dynamics of 
NSI in India are not yet on their active agenda.  
 
Section 1 brings out that in the academic discourse carried out at the start of the 
reforms by both, the advocates of liberalization as well the opposing side, academics 
and policymakers alike had spoken of the reforms to target the stimulation of ‘major 
innovations’ as a major task. The side arguing for liberalization believed that to 
accomplish this task changes in the policies would have to target the problem of 
insufficient number of ‘large firms’ and their freedom to follow up on the prospects of 
profit. In the emerging academic discourse where differing claims persist regarding 
the achievements and limitations of the national system(s) of innovation, the nature of 
contribution that the corporate sector has made or is able to make to the development 
and diffusion of major innovations in the economy and society is however still to 
become an area of debate.  
 
In Section 2, this article also focuses therefore on the question that as to what extent 
the large private sector firms that have now complete freedom, are being able to 
contribute to the development and diffusion of new t chnology. In what way they 
have tackled the issue of introduction of major innovations in the Indian economy on 
the basis of home grown capabilities, be acquired through the absorption of 
technology imports or developed through indigenous efforts. It also points out that by 
offering a description of the evolution of NSI in the post-reform period and assessing 
the emerging structure with the help of the indictors such as growth in production 
based on new technologies (IT & BT), R&D efforts, patents and patent applications, 
educational system, availability of venture capital and so on the engagement with the 
challenge put forward in the earlier academic discourse remains unfulfilled. 
 
In Section 3, this article suggests that we will have to also ask whether the national 
and state level systems of S&T that are publicly funded are taking an appropriate 
direction of R&D effort and the role that the policymakers can expect these structures 
to perform in the future in the case of Indian NSI. It suggests that as there is a 
systemic connection of the evolving national system of innovation with the 
inequalities emerging in the co-evolving socio-economic system the theoretical 
framework should be updated to incorporate the dimensions of growing inequality, 
control of the resources for innovation shifting from the government to the corporate 
world, societal needs being ignored by the practitioners of science and technology 
based innovation, etc., with the aim to include it in he empirics being explored in the 
current academic discourse.  
                                               
6 Policymakers seem to be totally convinced of the success of reform measures and are announcing 
from all kinds of platforms how India will be a developed country by the year 2020. Abdul Kalam, 
formerly the Chairperson of Science Advisory Council and currently the President of Indian republic is 
well known for making such statements. Similarly, Manmohan Singh, currently the Prime Minister, 
who was responsible in the early nineties for shifting he country from the path of internal liberaliztion 
to external liberalization, is also overenthusiastic about the success of reforms in the sphere of S&Tand 
is ready for further openness in the areas of even food and energy. Even though imports in these two 
spheres are increasing, his government is getting ready to enhance the global integration of S&T in 
both these spheres.  
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In Section 4, it argues that the latest evidence on NSI dynamics is required to be 
debated by embedding the empirics in an updated theoretical explanation because the 
earlier discourse had understood the problem of technological performance to be a 
question of merely how to stimulate the in-house technological capabilities and 
behaviour of a large firm for the introduction of major innovations. It suggests that 
using a non-heroic approach to technical change the updated theoretical framework 
should be capable of providing a systemic explanatio  of the failures and successes 
and incorporate evidence on the performance of functio s of the innovation systems 
connected with the creation of technological knowledg , systems of competence 
building, learning and innovation; articulation of demand, regulation and formation of 
markets; prioritising of public and private sources and supply of resources for 
innovation and development of appropriate mechanisms for advocacy and regulation 
of technological change.  
 
Section 1:Academic discourse on the nature of reforms to be undertaken for the 
NSI transformation in the mid eighties  
From the discourse carried out on the dynamics of natio al system(s) of innovation 
(NSI) on the eve of reforms in the mid eighties, the following three issues emerge in a 
quite prominent way for our consideration today: a) the nature of challenge laid in 
respect of the type of innovation (s) and competences to be achieved in the future, b) 
the points of differences and agreement among the participants in the discourse that 
are relevant to the outcomes obtaining in respect of the innovations undertaken and c) 
the points ignored by the earlier discourse but highly relevant to understanding the 
actually observed behaviour of concerned actors and impact of the policy changes. 
 
1.1 The challenge in respect of innovation and competence building 
India is known to possess an intermediate level of S&T capabilities and a large part of 
these S&T capabilities were certainly accumulated during the period of pre-
liberalization policy regime. For the organization and management of these 
capabilities efforts were mainly carried out by those structures of S&T that were 
established and nurtured during the same pre-liberazation period. But today a 
significant part of the literature is quite depreciative of the achievements of pre-
liberalization period. Even those who are more careful have been uncritically 
accepting the viewpoint of the advocates of liberalization that the government was 
hostile to the corporate sector during the pre-liberalization period and the 
governmental S&T system was altogether de-linked from the enterprise sector in 
India. The worse off you can show the past, the better off appears the present. It is 
self-serving argument for the advocates of reforms because arguing that the economy 
was in bad shape will help credit all the improvement to the efforts of external 
liberalization and deregulation. 
  
However, it cannot be forgotten that even those very academics that favoured the 
policy of external liberalization did accept the fact of incremental or minor 
innovations being undertaken in the economy. They accepted that at least during the 
period of pre-liberalization policy regime India had developed industrial capabilities 
across the sectors for both, production operations and investment. The challenge laid 
before the policymakers was one of formulating changes in the pre-liberalization 
regime with the aim to stimulate and create conditions for a much wider diffusion of 
major innovations in the Indian economy.  
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Bhagwan (1982) who was an active contributor from the side opposing external 
liberalization had made a study of the capital goods sector in 1979-80. This study 
attempted to assess the nature of product and process innovations carried out in ten of 
the largest firms in each of the three sectors of machine tools, heavy electrical and 
chemical equipment manufacture. Bhagvan came to conclusion in this study that 
technological innovations of a major kind were lacking. The concept of ‘major’ 
innovation used was based on what the firms themselve  thought were ‘major’ in 
terms of cost, time taken, importance of sales, etc. Bhagvan lists 110 innovations 
made by the firms covered in the sample, 40 had taken three or more years from the 
state of conceiving the initial idea to the prototype stage. The rest of innovations had 
taken two year or less. On the basis of time taken to complete the innovations and the 
total R&D investments dedicated by the firms in thesample, Bhagvan concludes that 
about two thirds of the innovations cited by the Indian capital goods firms were really 
minor technical changes, adaptations and improvements. 
 
Debate was about whether the cost incurred to achieve this technological mastery was 
high and could have been reduced by opening up and liberalising the internal market.  
It is possible to cite here the contributions of Ashok Desai who worked on the state of 
innovations in India during the seventies and eighties and advocated for the removal 
of governmental controls to stimulate innovations i the economy.  Among the Indian 
academics Ashok Desai was a key votary of the adoption of a policy of external 
liberalization and considered explicitly the nature of challenge in respect of 
innovation. Desai believed that imitation has been the basis of new competition in 
Indian industry and major innovations have been discouraged due to the absence of 
large firms. Incremental innovations have been dominating the scene and are costing 
the country quite heavily. Desai described four points of origin of in-house R&D in 
firms in India-quality control, technical services, material adaptation and plant and 
equipment construction. Desai (1987) notes a high proportion of Indian corporate 
R&D to be also devoted to developing new products (product differentiation, related 
product but minor innovations) on the basis of imported technology. While making an 
assessment of the improvisations practised which had raised in his view the costs of 
technological mastery for India, Desai (1987) stated that whilst import-processing and 
import-replacing firms have not disappeared altogether the improving firm has 
become the leading element.  
 
But when Desai (1987) described the improvisations that the Indian firms attempt to 
be of two major types and characterised as scale adpt tion and market adaptation, his 
work was countered and shown to be far from adequat to describe the changing 
situation of seventies. Sinha (1983) differed and found the Desai’s typology to be 
inadequate. Sinha suggested that this typology was empirical and applicable to 1950s 
and 60s environment only and constructed a typology using two principles-elements 
of technology and relatedness. Sinha included much finer categories such as : new 
products unrelated to existing product in technology and function, new products 
related in technology  but not in function to some existing product, improved model 
of existing product, product of capacity and beyond a  the range for which the firms 
possessed standard designs, development of process (or part of the process) of 
manufacturing an existing product, utilizing unconve tional self-fabricated equipment 
for the manufacturing system, etc. Using this typology, Sinha (1983) shows that 
during the period 1971-81 product innovation effort predominated in most industries. 
Sinha believed that product R&D observed in the case of new industries in India is 
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actually a case of reversal of the usual pattern of sequencing of innovative output in 
the industry life cycle observed in other countries-r production of product, output 
augmenting improvements, process improvements and new products. Sinha (1983) 
gave credit for the predominance of product R&D in his sample to the changed 
environment and the internal liberalization of domestic market that the government 
had started practising in the case of some activities in India during the decade of 
seventies itself7.  
 
Abrol (1989) argued that the above-described evidence of reverse sequencing is also 
attributable to the sample bias of the firms studied by Sinha (1983) for being active in 
industries that are highly sensitive to user requirements. However, it is not correct to 
treat all the adaptations of imported technology to be only a regression or 
downgrading of imported technology, as characterised by Desai. It was stated that we 
couldn’t judge innovative behaviour only in terms of the vertical movement made 
across the trajectory. Abrol (1989) considered this treatment to be inadequate because 
the way it considered the question of technological opportunity for a country of sub 
continental size requiring to use these adaptations f r the benefit of technical change 
in the Indian industry as a whole among both large and small firms. Abrol (1989) was 
of the view that the impact of market and scale adaptations cannot be always 
considered as a reduction in the standards of quality. He suggested that in India the 
impact of both market and scale adaptations on the dev lopment of backward linkages 
including the production of intermediate inputs and components should be taken into 
account. These impacts have not been realized in a b g way because the industry has 
not been able to tackle the problem of technological fragmentation. He considered the 
role and function of technological coordination to be quite critical to the introduction 
of major innovations.  
1.2 Characteristics of firms, market structure and innovative behaviour  
It is clear that the debate at the time of the start of eforms was certainly not on the 
fact of whether or not innovations were occurring i the Indian industry but on how 
the market environment and resources for the introduction of major innovations 
would be created in a country like India on a consistent and virtuous basis. Scholars 
not only recognised this weakness to be a significat f ilure of the pre-reform period 
but also deliberated on the reasons for how the Indian system(s) of innovation are not 
able to introduce major innovations. Characteristics of firms in terms of the attributes 
such as ownership and size, nature of market environment and the role of state, these 
three determinants were deliberated upon in this academic discourse for almost a 
decade. 
   
The advocates of liberalisation held the view that the innovations made had 
contributed to the deterioration of industrial performance. They indicated that the 
breadth and depth of capabilities created by the previous policy regime could have 
been achieved at a lesser cost if there was free flow of foreign technology from 
foreign sources in to Indian industry. They suggested that with a more open trade 
policy including technology the industry could have obtained from foreign sources 
                                               
7 In fact it would not be incorrect to point out tha the Indian economy was a mixed economy all 
through the ‘pre-reform period’. The private sector was in position to diversify and capture the new 
product space arising in quite a few of the new activities. Gradually the market environment was 
changing and these changes did have an influence on the technological behaviour of all the firms 
including private sector firms.  
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most of the local capabilities it has built (Desai, 1988). The opposite side held that 
although the foreign technology-finance nexus of India  industry had retarded the 
acquisition of capabilities, on the whole the earlier strategy was effective because it 
contributed to the absorption, adaptation and diffusion of foreign technology. In their 
view, the innovations wherever introduced, had positively contributed to the industrial 
policy (Subramanian, 1987). The advocates of opposite side proposed restraint with 
regard to the lifting of controls on foreign capital and technology, gradual reduction of 
controls on internal competition, increased governme t procurement of products 
based on new technologies from local sources, larger support for the expansion of 
internal markets through increased public investmen and changed composition of 
growth, stronger linkages between public S&T capabilities and industry and 
incentives to industry to invest more in R&D for major innovations (Subramanian, 
1991). 
 
Firm size was one of the most important determinants of innovative behaviour for the 
advocates of liberalization. Desai held this view that in India the most important 
factor affecting the accumulation of firm’s capabilities is their small size. Desai 
(1987) argued that “on the one hand, size constrain their capacity to invest in 
innovation and on the other hand, it makes them vulnerable to competition, increases 
their perceived risks, and makes them ignore long term objectives, which include 
innovation. Consequently, policies promoting small scale units, anti-monopoly 
policies and industrial licensing and trade policies which discriminate against the 
firms which are first to import technology militate against technological dynamism 
through their effect on large firm’s prospects for profit.” Subramaniam (1988), a 
leading academic on the opposite side, had however a different view that it is only the 
compulsive environment created by the government cotrols which induced the 
progressive firms to become technologically self-reliant more than their own effort. 
Fiscal and other economic policies of the government have provided incentives for 
inplant R&D and indigenisation. Of course, in taking this position he had utilized 
mainly the observation that the expenditure on R&D increased faster than payments 
on account of technology import by foreign collaborations in the Indian industry 
during the semi-insular period. But all the same he also conceded in his work that in 
India the proportion of large firms with the capacity to introduce autonomously major 
innovations was small (Subramaniam, 1988).    
 
Scholars on both sides of the policy divide had gotinto this question of the 
significance of the firm size for innovations introduced during the period of pre-
liberalization. Evidence collated by Bhagwan (1983) indicated that “the largest firm 
has a tendency to lag behind in the terms of contribution of innovation based on local 
technological effort”. Bhagwan (1983) stated that “the larget firm in both sectors, 
heavy electrical equipment manufacture and chemical equipment manufacture, did 
quite poorly in terms of the contribution to technology. Firms somewhat lower down 
the scale in size did more relevant and original innovations than the largest firms.” 
Bhagwan provides following reasons for the observed phenomenon of the firms down 
the scale being technologically more active. Bhagwan (1983) stated, “The giant firms 
have monopolized the market for complex and very expensive equipment. In order to 
survive the others have to produce and sell other kinds of equipment, as the 
competition is quite keen. This competition spurs on innovation. He also states that in 
the middle sized firms it is still possible for the top management to keep a eye 
regularly on the progress otherwise of the R&D departments, whereas discouraging 
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apathy and active top management involvement are not possible in the giant firms in 
the present context, as their top and middle mnagers are caught up in bureaucratic and 
hierarchical thinking and practices, which are also replicated in their R&D. 
 
C.P Chandersekhar (1988) stated that in production small scales are by no means the 
result of state control of large firms. He indicated “rather they appear to be the fall out 
of inadequate controls which leaves certain crucial aspects of the investment decision 
to be determined completely by market forces. If in such an environment private 
investors were not protected from international competition, they would in all 
probability have opted out of undertaking investments i  the areas studied rather than 
set up viable capacities with the world market as their target. This was inevitable 
given the nature of the decision making unit in the corporate sector (conglomerates) 
and the context in which India entered the stream of industrialization”. 
 
Take the problem of over-diversification, which Desai thought was an adverse effect 
of the government policies on trade and licensing, particularly anti-monopoly policy 
and policy of the protection of small-scale units. Chandersekhar (1988) pointed out 
that in the case of firms belonging to business houses (conglomerate firms) there is a 
tendency of spreading risk by investing in a large number of products without 
exploiting the scale economies hen permitted. Goyal (1988) provided the evidence to 
the effect that the conglomerates have used extensively the licensing and controls to 
pre-empt the entry of others into a chosen field in the past, resulting in retrogressive 
technological situation. Goyal (1988) reports that in high technology areas, the de 
facto official policy was to grant licenses in a manner that the monopoly houses / 
TNCs could obtain exclusive monopoly in these fields to encourage them to bring 
technology required.  
 
On the subject of competition spurred by imitation, it was pointed out that initiatives 
announced by the government to upgrade technology were never duly implemented to 
become a problem for the large firms. Further, it was also suggested that the claim of 
free rider type imitation making the large firms vulnerable does not hold in a general 
way. There are reasons to believe that in most of the cases the reverse may be true. In 
many cases imitation was shown o have facilitated saving of foreign exchange, 
creation of design capacity in capital goods producing firms, cheapening of 
intermediate inputs and a higher level productive use of factors available in 
abundance. Abrol (1989) suggested that stronger patnt protection and foreign brand 
names use had not generated quality in pharmaceutical industry. Evidence was 
provided that large firms could indulge in the sale of poor quality and unsafe goods 
when the public control was weakened in the pharmaceutical and other consumer 
goods industry. It was argued that in large group (long chain) industries competition is 
based on favoured access to factor supplies, finance d licences, high level of image 
building activities and unethical restrictive sales promotion for the large firms. 
Evidence was provided that in many cases price policies of large firms are geared to 
keep the small firms margins to the minimum, which has led to obsolescence and lack 
of modernization of technology used by small-scale units. Abrol (1989) suggested that 
the policy of external liberalization might not lead to full exploitation of scale 
economies and x-efficiency by large firms in the large group industries. It might even 
result in the tendency of disinvestment from the technology intensive steps. 
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The ownership of firms, particularly the distinction between subsidiaries of foreign 
firms, domestic private firms and public enterprises, was shown to be also having a 
determining impact on issues such as the access to foreign sources of technology, 
finance and marketing or commercialization channels. Characteristic such as 
managerial structures and practices, relationship with labour and labour unions, etc., 
were shown to have an impact on technological innovati n. The side arguing for 
external liberalization was of the view that foreign subsidiaries realize higher unit 
value per unit of output as well as higher capacity utilization than heir competitors 
though the difference was not significantly large (Desai, 1983). Desai argued that it is 
thus important to confer monopoly on the firms that import technology in the first 
instance because the above has shown that the size of market is very important for 
R&D, which is shown to be complementary to rather than competitive with 
technology imports. Abrol (1989) argued that we could also understand the realization 
of higher value per unit output to be associated with marketing capabilities and 
market power rather than a consequence of R&D.  
 
Studies done by Subramaniam and Pillai (1975, 83 and 84) indicated a very different 
story in respect of foreign controlled firms. Their conclusions were opposite of what 
Desai had concluded regarding foreign controlled firms’ technological behaviour. In 
an UNCTAD study of the Indian capital goods sector d ne by Pillai, Alagh and 
Subramaniam (1984) pointed out that there re significant differences across ownership 
categories in the pattern of technology import. Foreign subsidiaries and controlled 
firms were shown to have imported a higher number of technology elements in 
packaged forms. The impact on outflow of resources wa higher in their case. Foreign 
controlled firms were found to be remitting to foreign licensors three times more than 
their R&D expenditure. The adaptive behaviour of the firms was found to be different 
across ownership categories. Foreign controlled firms and minority joint ventures 
were found to be renewing their licensing agreements with more alacrity, implying a 
high lead time for absorption and low degree of loca  adaptation compared to 
domestic firms. In their study on the role of MNCs in the building of technology 
capabilities in Indian pharmaceutical and electronics industry, Subramaniam and 
Pillai (1984) suggested that on the whole the profile of MNC controlled firms is one 
which orients itself to the changing patterns of global interests of the foreign parent 
organization. There is less integration with the productive structure with the result that 
the import content is high. Lesser emphasis on intra-mural research and greater 
emphasis on domestic marketing clearly reflect the motives of MNCs as being one of 
consolidating the oligopolistic leadership in the Indian market for quick returns rather 
than strengthening the technological base for stable growth. 
 
Abrol (1989) opined that the academic discourse has been limiting the study of 
technological performance to the in-house capability building processes. Relations 
with suppliers and customers do not figure in the academic discourse. Interrelations 
and interactions among firms were not getting into the discourse on failures of the 
policy regime. Abrol (1989) suggested that studies undertaken on the connection (s) 
of market structure with innovative behaviour will have to be made far more 
comprehensive with regard to the explanatory variables. It was apparent that the side 
favouring external liberalization was ignoring the d terminants such as the existence 
of monopoly power determined technology behaviour, b siness house behaviour due 
to the conglomerate nature of large firms, foreign co trol and ownership in large firms 
determining the incentives and disincentives for technological behaviour and the lack 
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or existence of public control determining the technology behaviour of large firms, 
etc. 
 
In the earlier academic discourse, since both the sid s had tended to treat the 
technological conduct as being constituted mainly by the in-house RDD behaviour 
and the behaviour relating to acquisition of imported echnology, it is not surprising 
that they had an agreement on the issue of insufficient number of large firms being a 
key reason for the failures in respect of the introduction of major innovations. This 
raised an important question about how the state policies would have to be redefined 
to allow the firms to grow in size and favour them in respect of state support to enable 
the firms to remain capable of autonomous introduction of major innovations. In what 
way the state policies need to be reshaped to affect th  technological performance and 
impact through the improved interactions and better systemic interrelations of 
domestic firms with the remaining productive structure did not find a focal point in 
the academic discourse undertaken in the mid eightis.  
 
1.3 State, competence building and innovation in industry 
In India, at the time of the start of reforms undertaken in the form of liberalization, 
privatization and deregulation, the policy debate was characterized by widely 
differing stances on the role of the state in the accumulation of scientific and 
technological capabilities and in the fostering of industrial S&T capabilities for the 
introduction of major innovations. The advocates of liberalisation argued that 
licensing policy, anti-monopoly policy, policies promoting small scale industry and 
trade policy incorporating phased manufacturing programmes have tended to increase 
the perceived risks of large private sector firms by making it uncertain whether and 
when they can follow-up prospects of profits and which in turn constrain firms 
capacity to invest in in-house R&D and make them ignore long term objectives 
including innovation (Desai, 1980, 84, 88). The oppsite view took the position that 
per se government intervention and protection from f reign competition cannot be 
held responsible for the technical inefficiency and stagnation in Indian industry 
(Subramanian, 1987).  
 
Their differences on the subject of policy regime to be followed in respect of the 
liberalization of trade, technology import and foreign capital were sharp and had an 
impact on the pace and sequencing of policy changes carried out as a part of reforms 
undertaken during the period of last two decades. The side arguing against external 
liberalization argued that as far as the internal development necessary for backup to 
the import of technology for adaptation, assimilation and diffusion is concerned 
broadly the earlier strategy was reasonable and effective, but for the foreign finance 
technology nexus which restricted the pace of adaptation, assimilation and diffusion 
of technology. Subramaniam and Pillai (1976) were of the view that the transnational 
corporations (TNCs) are unwilling to part with know-why and they impose restrictive 
conditions, which tend to work against the absorptin and diffusion of foreign 
technology in the national productive system. Subramaniam compared the RBI 
surveys and had taken a view that the assets transferred under collaboration 
agreements had reduced after the implementation of liberalized technology import 
policy.  
 
The side arguing for liberalization held an opposite view on the issue of technology 
import connection. Desai (1985) and Alam (1986, 1987) had taken a view that the 
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TNCs are willing to part with know-why if the Indian firms are willing to pay for it in 
terms of costs and duration of agreements. Desai viewed the restrictive technology 
import policy to be a key reason for the acquisition of shallow technology packages. 
Alam (1987) emphasised the reason of the existence of non-competitive market 
environment to be also playing a role in the acquisition of shallow technology 
packages.  
 
However, it was quite clear that as a whole the sidfavouring external liberalization 
of the policy on technology import appeared to rest their case on ample scope the 
borrowers have in respect of getting deeper and broader packages of imported 
technology from the foreign collaborations for affecting absorption and adaptation. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to find out whether the packages obtained by the 
Indian firms after the liberalization of technology imports have been broad and deep 
or shallow.   
 
The advocates of liberalisation also argued that the Indian corporate sector is likely to 
have a better incentive under the policy regime of liberalisation to link itself directly 
with the structures of publicly funded R&D institutons and academic structures. They 
believed that the Indian corporate sector would be a l to involve the publicly funded 
RTD structures in the execution of these tasks in a better and cost effective way. They 
maintained that the tasks of technology acquisition, absorption, improvement and 
development would get better tackled in an environme t of strong competition and 
removal of controls. They argued for the implementation of stronger patent 
protection, freedom for collaboration between foreign companies and Indian business 
for the acquisition of know-how and joint R&D, immediate lifting of controls on 
internal competition, increased emphasis on export led growth to foster major 
innovations and public R&D laboratories to be made utonomous market friendly 
knowledge intensive business services selling organisations (Desai, 1984). 
 
Although they differed in overall terms on the issue of nature and significance of 
innovations and S&T capabilities created in the different industrial sectors during the 
period prior to the start of liberalization, but it is also very important to understand 
that the side arguing against did not have a problem with the argument of lack of large 
firms. It too considered the proportion of large firms capable of introducing 
autonomously major innovations being small to be important structural rigidity and 
causing technological stagnation in the Indian economy.  It pointed out that there are 
structural rigidities functioning in the form of the narrow direction of domestic R&D 
because it was developing local substitutes for import restricted inputs and materials 
rather than developing cost effective processes or new products based on local factor 
endowment or mass consumption demand and much of governmental R&D being not 
related to the needs of industry and remaining unutilized by industry, a domestic 
market with low purchasing power and unequal income distribution, etc. It considered 
small market size to be playing the role of a key barrier to the autonomous 
introduction of major innovation and as well being responsible for the lack of 
sufficient technological accumulation and competence building. Therefore, this side 
was ready to support the goal of higher level of exports through both, domestic efforts 
and strategic alliances. If the policy changes on trade, investment and technology 
were aimed at increasing the exports, this side was willing to support the removal of 
those controls that prevent the emergence of large fi ms capable of autonomous 
introduction of major innovations. It is equally important to note that the side arguing 
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for liberalisation did not totally reject small size of the market as a reason for lack of 
innovation. The advocates of liberalisation only argued that the argument of small 
market size does not apply to many sectors of Indian industry because market is fairly 
large. It seems that these two sides did not really differ so much on the need to go 
ahead with the policy regime favouring internal liberalisation as much on external 
liberalization. Their main differences were centred on external liberalization and had a 
set of diametrically opposite viewpoints on the issue of how the policymakers should 
be dealing with the problems of protection against mports, protection for small scale 
industry and domestic firms in general and more specifically with the problems of 
foreign finance, capital and technology nexus. 
 Section 2: Post-liberalization corporate technological behaviour and 
performance  
 
2.1 Internal liberalization and patterns of competence building 
In India, the new policy regime of liberalization was implemented in a gradual 
manner in two distinct phases of internal and external liberalization. During the first 
phase of internal liberalization, beginning from the mid-eighties onwards up to 1991, 
the policymakers had largely their thrust on the start of a process of internal 
competition. With external liberalisation policies still on hold domestic firms were 
allowed to grow in size and increase their share in the Indian market. During this 
phase they also had relatively better protection against imports. The policymakers 
were encouraging the Indian corporate sector to acquire the means of industrial 
upgrading through technology imports and removal of internal controls8.  While 
domestic firms got the government to protect the India  market from the entry of new 
foreign firms, in almost all the sectors they made th governments to de-license 
sufficiently the industrial space, relax the regulations regarding foreign collaborations 
and foreign exchange and dilute the controls over the expansion of Indian big 
business to provide themselves with enhanced access to the home market. The 
government had eased the restrictions in respect of the scope and terms of duration 
and payments for technology collaborations. The corporate sector was provided with a 
wide range of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to take an active part in the 
strengthening of in-house technological capabilities. It was even encouraged to access 
the publicly funded R&D institutions for the purpose of consulting them for problem 
solving and sponsorship of R&D for taking their assistance in the task of absorption 
of imported technologies.  
 
                                               
8 Starting with the mid-eighties the government undertook these reforms at a fairly good speed for a 
period of about six to seven years. The Indian corporate sector was freed from the controls of the 
government over capacity regulation, reservation of markets and access to foreign exchange. Capacity 
controls were removed more particularly in the sectors of importance to the big business. Selectively 
several industrial segments were de-reserved and de-licensed for the benefit of their entry. The 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act was diluted to facilitate the expansion and 
diversification of large firms or firms belonging to the big business groups. In case of foreign 
investment regulation the step taken was the grant of automatic approval, or exemption from case by 
case approval, for equity investment up to 51 percent and for foreign technology agreements in 
identified high-priority industries. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was modified so that companies 
with foreign equity exceeding 40 percent of the total were to be treated on par with foreign companies. 
However, foreign controlled companies were restrained from having a direct access to the internal 
markets. Foreign controlled companies were allowed an entry if they fulfilled the obligations of 
furthering the exports from India or of bringing to the country highly monopolised technologies. 
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As far as positive outcomes are concerned, they seem to indicate that the sectors of 
pharmaceutical and automotive industry were the key beneficiaries of the hold put on 
external liberalization by the policymakers during this phase. But their better 
performance also confirms that the advocates of external liberalization were far more 
incorrect than the advocates of internal liberalization regarding their conclusions 
about the corporate technological behaviour. Empirical outcomes in respect of 
corporate technological performance contradict quite consistently the theoretical 
understanding that the advocates of external liberalization had devised to explain the 
limitations of earlier policy regime. Analysis undertaken also tells us that though 
pharmaceutical and automotive industries performed b tter in respect of competence 
building but their better performance is more of an exception to the rule. Below we 
discuss how we assess the empirics obtaining concerni g corporate technological 
performance under reforms in relation to the dimension of breadth and depth of 
imported technology packages. 
 
Experience of the collaboration and in-house technological activity undertaken during 
the phase of internal liberalisation indicates that as the Indian corporate sector was 
allowed to import foreign technologies under highly diluted restrictions and without 
any technological coordination, what actually followed in respect of technological 
assimilation after the policy change was very different from the initial expectations of 
policymakers. First, the policy of technology import itself was allowed to become a 
vehicle for the foreign firms to demand financial prticipation from the collaborating 
firms in India. The policy was implemented without any discipline regarding the entry 
of foreign capital. Under sectional pressures the policy ended up allowing frequently 
an indiscriminate entry of the foreign capital. Furthe , though this entry was facilitated 
by the changes made in the name of technology modernization and improvement, yet 
there existed no safeguards in the policy of technology import to ensure the import of 
technological know-how packages with greater breadth nd depth. Two, the import of 
technology by the big business firms was particularly targeted largely to the 
acquisition of brand names. The packages of know-ho that they chose to import 
were fairly shallow. Third, the changes made in technology import policy have been a 
facilitator of greater technological fragmentation.  
 
Given below is some of the available evidence for the above-mentioned trends. 
 
During this period there was a major spurt in the activities of foreign collaboration 
with the west. In India, by the mid-eighties when the new policy period with its bias 
towards liberalization was ushered in, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
were out of the picture altogether in respect of technological alliances. In the early 
eighties, the country signed annually on an average about 800 collaborations. In 1992 
the figure stood at 1520. Cases involving financial p rticipation had increased at a 
rapid rate. In 1992, the number of cases involving foreign investment was 736. This 
means that more than fifty percent of the total colaborations approved in 1992 were 
cases involving foreign investment. Even more significant was the fact that the 
number of cases involving foreign investment was clo e to almost double of the figure 
of total number of collaborations involving foreign investment (385) during the whole 
decade of seventies. Foreign collaboration agreements r ached a figure of about one 
thousand by the mid-eighties. During 1985-1990 the total number of new agreements 
approved was 5203. This was 80 percent more than the 2916 approved over the 
preceding five-year period 1980-1984.  
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Right from the beginning in the collaboration agreem nts there was an absence of 
demand for the increase of technology content in the corporate sector in most 
industries. From the side of the national enterprise sector there was much interest 
shown in the import of capital goods and transfer o the advantage of assets like brand 
names. It would not be wrong to claim that much of the foreign collaboration activity 
in engineering sectors was motivated for the nationl enterprise sector by the 
advantage to be realized by the acquisition of foreign brand names. Gradually there 
was also much encouragement for the Indian industry to enter into collaborations, 
which sought the financial participation of foreign partners in the name of acquisition 
of newer technologies. The stimulus for this new reorientation in the policy was 
strengthened by the compulsions of increased competition hat demanded these types 
of agreements where the transfer of advantages offered by the acquisition of foreign 
brand names and foreign partners was the motivation.  
 
There is evidence that there was an absence of demand for real innovation from large 
parts of the domestic enterprise. This made the purchasers of technology to persist 
with the import of shallow technology packages. Between 1985-86 and 1990-91 the 
average technology import payments intensity was as mall as 0.21 percent. Firms 
spent less than 1.1 percent of the sales on technology import. Surveys made showed 
that firms involving foreign investment were spending less on in-house R&D (Alam 
1993).  
 
A number of industrial groups changed themselves to don the new clothes of foreign 
collaborating firms having hybrid brand names like Wipro-Sun, HPL-HP, Hero-
Honda, PSI-Bull, etc. This situation was partly a product of the craze being built by 
these firms for the foreign brand names. Within this structure the demand for 
indigenously developed technologies that did not prvide the foreign brand names 
was bound to be low. There was a flood of collaborati ns for assembly of televisions, 
two wheelers, cars, etc. Dualistic industrial structures emerged even in the industries 
that produce standard products such as lamps, soaps matches, etc. For the 
multinational corporations innovation was not the main means to increase their profits 
in which they were dominant. They had much more powerful weapons in their hands 
for increasing their profits, namely supporting their brand name with more 
advertisement and strengthening their monopolistic trading network. Needless to say, 
if it were not technology but the brand names contribu ing to the success of the 
multinationals in the consumer goods sector, why would such a market generate 
demand for indigenous technologies? (Menon, 1987)  
 
Evidence is clear that as far as the performance of the older big business groups is 
concerned they rarely utilised their potential for the development and realization of 
technological economies during the period of internal liberalization, the market 
remained fragmented between different type of technologies and sizes. The industries 
that supplied inputs continued suffering from the problems of market size being 
smaller that what it actually could be if there was no technological fragmentation. The 
example of engineering industries is a case in point. Be it the tractor and auto industry 
developments, or the developments in electronics the problem of technological 
fragmentation was further compounded. Due to the removal of restrictions on the 
technology associated imports of capital goods and components there was no 
possibility of stopping the big business groups from signing the foreign collaborations 
having clauses that tied them to their respective partners for the import of capital 
 14 
goods, components and engineering materials. Needless to say, the older big business 
groups were more interested in the brand names that came with these collaborations.  
 
The situation in the capital goods industry, where th  public sector was active, had 
therefore come to become desperate quite early during this period (Jacobbson & 
Alam, 1994). Despite the new investments the orders were being placed with foreign 
suppliers, resulting in the under-utilisation of capacities, which in turn meant the 
threat to the viability of the very companies. The first causalities were power 
equipment and machine building for fertilizer industry. This happened in spite of the 
fact that BHEL equipment had been performing creditably. The sufferings of supply 
units such as Bharat Heavy Plates and Vessels (BHPV) and Bharat Heavy Electrical 
Equipment (BHEL) increased during the period in a big way. The machine tools 
sector had started stagnating. The co-existence of under-utilized capacity in the capital 
goods industry and utilization of imported equipment was even affecting the design 
and engineering and consultancy organizations. For example Project Planning and 
Development India Limited, the premier fertiliser consultancy organisation having 
capacity to design two fertiliser factories per year, had work for only one factory in 
1987, with nothing more in the pipeline. From the above it would not be wrong to 
conclude that the growth and freedom of the Indian corporate sector were achieved by 
the Indian state in a way that also weakened the national system of innovation in 
respect of its autonomous capacity to innovate because the engineering and design 
capabilities of the capital goods sector were either weakened or lost.  
 
Finally, in conclusion, it would not be incorrect to state on the basis of the above 
evidence that during the period of internal liberalization itself the industrial structure 
had undergone a significant change, though not on expected lines. There was an 
expectation that the big industry would make investments to introduce specialisation 
and achieve technological dynamism. The claim was th t with the removal of capacity 
restrictions and market entry barriers that were believ d to be preventing the big 
business groups from going for cheap, efficient anddynamic technological change 
these groups would be able to create technologies for new products, processes and 
systems not only based on the increased scope for the absorption and adaptation of 
imported know-how but also based on the development of indigenous R&D. While 
none of these macro trends could be realised by the big business during the period of 
internal liberalisation, but the crisis of the economy was at the doorstep. The solution 
to the crisis of the Indian economy came through the c anges in the regime of internal 
liberalisation. 
 
Evidence also seems to indicate that with the exception of some of the domestic 
private sector firms in the pharmaceutical and automotive industries in India in most 
industries the Indian corporate sector had failed to initiate the processes of integration 
of the ‘latest’ major S&T advances into the productive economy of India in a virtuous 
way. Introduction of the major innovations was in no way undertaken any better than 
before. Small size of the market in many sectors had come to appear as a key 
constraint for the further growth of domestic firms. Finally these reasons only made 
the Indian big business to clamour, on the one hand for the relaxation of restrictions 
put on foreign direct investment and technology imports, and on the other for the 




2.2 External liberalization and patterns of corporate technological accumulation 
The second phase of policy reforms were introduced amidst the chorus of the voices 
of there is no alternative (TINA) to external liberalisation9. At the end of eighties the 
perception of pro-liberalisation policymakers was that the Indian government cannot 
discipline the public sector institutions, and the private sector industry by itself was 
quite strong to take on the functions of the governme t in a number of sectors. The 
big business had a major interest itself in engineer g the feeling in favour of further 
liberalisation. The big business was looking forward to encourage the governments in 
power to privatise the assets of the private sector. Of course, there were also factors 
like the changed conditions of post-Soviet world, which did prompt the Indian big 
business to promote readily the pace of the reforms that have tended to drive the big 
business to subordinate its own strategic interests in a big way to the foreign capital. 
In the second phase of reforms the added thrust of policy changes was external 
liberalisation. There was a massive change in the country’s economic and 
technological environment due to the introduction of economy wide liberalisation of 
trade and investment. For the Indian corporate sector the policy change of nineties 
definitely has implied a wide range of new competitive pressures from the foreign 
companies. Though to cushion the impact of external liberalisation the changes were 
introduced in a gradual way by the Indian government, but for the Indian corporate 
sector the changes that this new regime has undoubtedly forced till date are by no 
means insignificant.  
 
Coming to the consequences for liberalization of technology imports on technological 
accumulation, the advocates of external liberalization have not been proved again as 
arguing for an appropriate policy change. During the period of 1990s the trend of 
decrease in number of independent technical collaborations got even sharper. Those 
who were only interested in the signing of independent technical collaborations with 
zero equity or silent financial participation became far and fewer; take the year of 
2000 when out of the total of approved collaborations numbering 1248 the number of 
technical collaborations was mere 231. The situation is no better for technical 
                                               
9 First of all, the corporate sector, including foreign companies, was gradually freed completely from 
the controls used by the government to reserve and regulate their access to the Indian markets. Second, 
the policy of total freedom to the Indian firms to enter into collaborations of their own choice with the 
foreign firms was introduced. Over the period of last two decades the policy of greater openness to 
obtain technology import from the foreign firms has graduated today to the level of the policy of total 
freedom for foreign direct investment. Third, the policy of higher fiscal incentives and non-fiscal 
concessions to the corporate sector for undertaking in-house R&D has been considerably strengthened 
by the government to attract the industry to come forward for the establishment of in-house capabilities 
for greater innovation. All these concessions have be n given with the aim to encourage the enterprise 
sector to ‘innovate’ faster in respect of the development of new products and processes and the 
absorption of imported technological know-how. Fourth, the policy for protection of intellectual 
property rights has been changed to bestow an absolute monopoly to the generators of intellectual 
property again with the aim to encourage the corporati ns to invest in the development of technology 
in a bigger way. Fifth, there has been a shift in the patterns of regulation of development finance. The
new policy regime has moved in the direction of deregulation of the priority lending earlier undertaken 
actively by the development finance institutions. It encourages the foreign venture capital entities to 
freely establish their operations in the sectors of their own choice. Sixth, the corporate sector has been 
offered a strategic role by the government in the processes of policy-making, planning and regulation 





collaborations in the year of 2001. Up to the month of August 2001 out of the total of 
approved collaborations numbering 1260 the number of technical collaborations was 
mere 197. During the year 2002 out of 2273 foreign collaborations approved 1958 
cases involved foreign investment, which means thatere were only 315 (13%) 
independent technical collaborations signed by the Indian industry. 
 
Further, it also needs to be noted that while there were only 4% majority approvals in 
1991, the share increased to almost 16 percent by 1997. The most dramatic change 
was witnessed by the wholly owned category of firms in the foreign direct investment. 
The share of subsidiaries was itself seventeen percent by 1997. The government no 
longer insists on Indian partnership for FDI in most industrial sectors. Merger and 
acquisition activity grew at an unprecedented rate during the 1990s, rising from US $ 
3.5 million to US $ 1 billion by 2001. Many such arrangements were worked out 
between Indian and foreign firms and the bulk of these involved MNCs. To wrap up 
this subsection, it is clear that foreign companies have a higher level of control in the 
Indian Corporate sector than before. 
 
2.3 Impact of the freedom given in respect of imported technologies on exports  
Contrary to the expectations of the advocates of liberalization, foreign technology 
licensors do not want domestic firms to become competitors by providing 
disembodied technology in high and medium technology sectors. Nagesh Kumar 
(2003) confirms through his study on the determinants of exports during the period of 
liberalization that India has not able to acquire foreign technologies for improving 
export competitiveness. The relationship of foreign technology licensing with export 
competitiveness was found by him to be negative overall. Favourable effects were 
found only in case of the low high technology / low technology sectors. This clearly 
suggests that the advocates of external liberalization were incorrect in suggesting that 
the liberalization of technology import would allow the large firms to increase the 
breadth and depth of technology imports to a significant level and benefit major 
innovations leading to more exports from these firms. It is also clear that at the 
moment the country has fewer bargaining chips to get th  foreign licensors to part 
with the technology packages that would allow domestic firms to become export 
competitive on the basis of imported know-how in high-tech manufacturing. This can 
work to an extent in the case of low technology manuf cturing and in services sector 
where the factors other than knowledge are per se poviding competitive advantage to 
the domestic firms. 
 
This is also further confirmed on account of the results obtaining for the positive role 
of foreign direct investment. It is well known that prior to the regime of liberalisation 
foreign ownership or MNC affiliation did not count much in respect of increase in the 
exports from India. After the introduction of liberalisation foreign ownership / MNC 
affiliation appeared to have started mattering; in case of the determinant of foreign 
ownership / MNC affiliation, favourable effect is observable across all technology 
classes. It seems that the Indian locations are also beginning to be integrated by the 
foreign firms through the establishment of their affili tes in the sectors like auto and 
other consumer industries. In the case of information echnology services sector, a 
similar trend is growing. According to NASSCOM, offshore operations of global IT 
majors accounted for 10-15 per cent of IT services and BPO exports and captive BPO 
units account for 50 per cent of BPO exports. MNC-owned captive units are scaling 
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BOX 1 
PRIVATE SECTOR IN R&D: POST 1991 
• 87.4% OF R&D EXPENDITURE IN INDIA IS STILL 
BORNE BY GOVERNMENT: THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS 
IN POOR SECOND POSITION. 
• In house R&D Units have only Risen by 207 units Even 9 
Years after Reform Package: (1000 in 1990 to 1207 in 1999). 
• Private Sector R&D Expenditure is less than 15% of Total 
R&D Expenditure in India Today amounts to less than 0.1% 
of Turnover. 
• R&D Expenditure Declines Between 1994-1995 and 1996- 7 
from 0.70% to 0.64% of Turnover for Both Public and 
Private Sectors. 
• IN CONTRAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SPEND 3-4% 
OF TURNOVER ON R&D: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT ARE ALMOST EQUAL.  
up their operations quite steadily with the headcount forecast to grow by at least 30 
per cent this year.   
 
2.4 Performance of liberalization in respect of technology assimilation & in-house R&D 
and engineering 
 
Technological change is understood in the developing countries in terms of the 
combined effect of in-house R&D and technology import. We need to go beyond the 
evidence analysed here regarding the emerging pattern of acquisition of foreign 
technology and look into the practice of large private sector firms in respect of 
technological assimilation and in-house R&D to pursue the issue of determinants of 
technological 
performance of large 
private sector firms. 
An analysis of the 
recent record of Indian 




in the form of case 
studies by Basant and 
Chandra (INTECH, 
1999) confirms the 
inadequacy of 




Typically, acquisition of technology from abroad has been seen as the key element of 
technology to become competitive. However, indigenous R&D undertaken to 
assimilate foreign technology and exploit technology spillovers along with access to 
complementary assets for competitive manufacturing appears to be still missing from 
the technological conduct of large enterprises. Share of industrial development in total 
R&D in private sector industry declined from 71.3 % in 1977-78 to 33.9 % in 1996-
97 (R&D in Industry, DST). 
 
In the case of Indian Basic Chemical Industry, Naray n n (2004) provides evidence 
of not only than more than half of the firms in basic chemicals industry are passive 
but also that higher vertical integration had a negative impact on the technology 
investments. He also provides evidence that even in the post-liberalization period the 
medium-sized firms in the Indian Basic Chemicals industry have been investing 
relatively (to their size) more on R&D than the firms that are larger and smaller sized.  
 
With the withdrawal of policy support to the civilian public sector units whose 
influence has been significant on the building of indigenous engineering design 
capabilities the Indian system of innovation will be largely a lame duck; as compared 
to 50.5 % in private sector 79.2 % of the R&D personnel in public sector report 
Engineering & Technology as their field of specialis t on-RDI, DSIR, October 1999. 
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It is not prudent to leave the crucial task of building the capabilities for engineering 
and design to the private investors whose track record is extremely poor in this regard. 
Whereas take the pattern of employment of engineers in the private sector, they are 
mostly deployed for marketing and after sales servic . Their involvement with the 
hardcore engineering is limited to detailed engineeri g work and services. A large 
part of the engineering sector confirms to the above description of technological 
behaviour of the large private sector firms. For example, this is true for the IT 
companies. Software packages represent a tiny proporti n of exports. Large amounts 
of development work take place at the client’s site. High skill tasks of analysis and 
design are left to the client. A lot of work that is confined to low skill software 
construction and testing work only comes to the laps of the Indian private sector. 
Large enterprises in the Indian software industry continue to be weak on the 
development of higher-level software skills. 
 
In order to refurbish the industrial R&D scene, theunion budgets starting with 1996-
97, 1997-98, 1998-99 to 1999-2000 had even several n w incentives to encourage the 
investments in R&D by industry; however judging from their impact it can be easily 
seen that there has been hardly any significant change in the growth of private sector 
R&D activities. Promotional efforts undertaken by the government to lure the 
corporate sector to participate in the development of indigenous technology have been 
far from effective. Even today, industrial production based wholly on indigenous 
R&D does not amount to more than 5% of the total.  
 
2.5 Narrowing of the industrial and product structure and new barriers to major 
innovation and technological accumulation   
 
A major aspect that needs to be underlined in respect of the dynamics of innovation 
system is the relation of innovation with the changing industrial structure and 
economic growth. Freedom that the policy provided in respect of project imports and 
technology choices to foreign investors appears to have had more adverse 
consequences than any substantive benefit for a systematic development of the 
industry. In the sectors like power and telecom which are critical to the process of 
technological transformation, the policy has led to the under-utilization of local 
production capacities that the country earlier develop d during the phase of pre-
liberalization with great sacrifices. Since the beginning of nineties the stated policy of 
the governments in power has been no restrictions on the foreign direct investment in 
power, telecom, roads, ports, oil and gas, coal andother non-fuel minerals. 
Deregulation and opening up have been implemented in the midst of severe 
constraints put on resource mobilization, an indirect consequence of a changed 
profligate fiscal policy. Available development funds were refused to the public sector 
for making investments. The state investments in power, telecom, roads etc., were 
systematically cut down on the plea of lack of resources while lowering taxes on 
luxury goods encouraged luxury consumption. The new po er policy allows the 
import of fuel and almost all the private sector proposals made during this period were 
gas based or based on imported coal. In the earlier policy reliance was on the 
utilization of domestic coal, which had made Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited 
(BHEL) to develop boilers that could utilize 40% ash in domestic coal. BHEL, the 
unique major Indian power plant equipment manufacturer, which has the capacity to 
manufacture a complete range of equipment for the power market, is a target of the 
multinationals whose own home markets are today saturated. By resorting to tied-
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credits the power multinationals were able to push in their equipment during the 
period under discussion in many Indian projects.  
 
The capital goods sector was one of the first sectors to undergo reforms in India. It is 
now well known that this sector has been affected adversely. The specific 
technological characteristics of the industry raise serious doubts about the ability to 
develop capability in the context of uncontrolled liberalization. The capital goods 
industry is in deep trouble because of the policy of liberalization, which allows the 
downstream industry to import capital goods unquestioningly. For the capital goods 
sector sectoral growth rate shrank from 15.24 during 85-91 to 5.27% during 91-97. 
Imports rose phenomenally faster during the period of 91-96 as compared to the 
period of 80-91. Since mid-1990s with liberalization measures like reduction in tariff 
rates and liberal import of second hand machinery there has been a serious adverse 
impact on the health of the machine building industry. Electrical machinery sub-sector 
registered a fall from 25.34% to 6.3%. Imports rose even faster during 91-96 as 
compared to the period of 80-91. While the related figure for imports was 21%, 
exports share remained at 6%. There was a large inflow of foreign technologies into 
the capital goods sector during 91-97. The share of non-electrical machinery in the 
value of output in registered manufacturing increased omewhat under controlled 
liberalization during the eighties but it has since decreased in the 1990s. In 1997-98 
the share of non-electrical machinery (at 1993-94 prices) was 4.8%-the same as its 
share in 1965-66 (shares of non-electrical machinery, tools and parts are taken from 
M. Padma Suresh 2004).  
 
In the case of the machine-building sector, there is no evidence of a gradual building 
of capabilities leading to exports and outward orientation in investment.  The 
contribution of the non-electrical machinery sector to exports remains poor. Exports 
of non-electrical machinery as percent of exports increased from 0.47% in 1960-61 to 
1.85% in 1970-71 and further to 3.2% in 1980-81. The figure has remained more or 
less the same since then with the share being 3.41% in 1999-00. Imports of non-
electrical machinery are higher and as percent of total imports were 6.05% in 1999-
00. During the period of liberalization, in the case of capital goods industry, the 
performance in respect of R&D investment has been highly disappointing. R&D 
investment was very low (Ministry of Finance, 97-98). In the case of machine tools 
industry, a recent survey also confirms that though during the period of liberalization 
foreign collaboration approvals significantly increas d the average R&D expenditure 
for the studied sample of firms remain till date less than 2%. Accounting for about 0% 
of net sales imports of raw materials and components are till date significant. 
 
In electronics industry, an immediate impact of the lib ral policies of eighties was an 
unprecedented shift in the product structure. The growth became concentrated in 
sectors with higher linkages in terms of imports, whereas sectors with higher linkage 
in terms of value added and employment lagged behind in output growth. The 
component sector remained characterized by the lack of investment coupled with low 
scale of operation and under utilization of capacity. By the end of 1980s the share of 
semiconductor industry in total electronics investment in India was around 10 percent 
as compared to the figure of 30 to 35 percent in the developed countries. There was a 
marked increase in the share of electronic consumer products at the cost of electronic 
intermediates and electronic capital goods. However, in case of computers, due to the 
controlled nature of internal liberalization it did become possible to make the foreign 
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companies that had preferred exit to sharing equity w h local firms in the 1970s to 
enter into joint ventures with the Indian partners. The absence of a strategic approach 
to the strengthening of international competitiveness is even more sharply reflected in 
the nineties. During the decade of nineties, the share of communication equipment 
experienced a marked decline. The production of data processing equipment was not 
able to keep pace with the ongoing IT trajectory and their share in total output 
remained stagnant or declined. In the case of electroni  intermediates, not only their 
share declined over the years but also components incorporating higher level of 
technology like the semiconductor devices recorded a sharp decline. It is to be 
underlined that even after the introduction of liberalization there has been an increase 
in the number of products, which recorded high production growth but low export 
intensity.  
 
2.6 MNEs get entrenched deeper in the productive and R&D structure 
In an industry consisting of a variety of firms that differ in terms of their access to 
technology, knowledge and other intangible assets, liberalization would certainly 
result in gainers and losers and the productivity gap between firms in an industry 
could widen.  However, from the perspective of understanding the relation between 
technology diffusion and liberalization, it is still relevant to check out whether the 
average productivity levels of an industry have increased or decreased during the 
post-liberalization period. In his introduction to a recently published Special issue of 
Economic and Political Weekly Siddarthan 2004 sums up the evidence becoming 
available with respect to the impact of liberalization on productivity, technical 
efficiency and growth. In concluding, his summing up suggests quite clearly that the 
studies undertaken by the scholars associated with the Institute of Economic Growth 
(IEG) do not support the hypothesis relating to an increase in productivity / efficiency 
in Indian industries consequent upon economic liberalization. Siddarthan 2004 reports 
that the total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the 1990s was lower than in the 
1980s. Siddarthan (2004) also concludes the results of their studies by stating that a) 
the main gainers have been MNEs and their affiliates which have better access to 
technology and other intangible assets, b) in the case of domestic firms those who 
have adopted a strategy of relying on non-equity route for technology imports against 
royalty payments are alone reported to have done well and c) the other domestic firms 
that have no networking or non-equity strategic alliances have not done well. Further, 
that in the case of domestic firms only when their t chnology and productivity gap 
was small in relation to MNEs they have done well under liberalization. 
 
2.7 Gains in industries benefiting from calibrated protection during the same period   
Take the cases of automobile and pharmaceutical industries, which have gained 
maximum in terms of the competitiveness of domestic firms and the building of 
competence during the period of last two decades. Both were beneficiaries of the 
policy of calibrated protection that the governments pursued to steer and nurture them 
throughout the period of eighties and nineties. External liberalization was put on hold 
till the beginning of twenty first century. The government insisted on the phased 
manufacturing programmes and partnership with Indian firms while allowing 
technology imports and foreign direct investments. Public sector firms were used to 
create the capabilities that have spun off individuals who have come into private 
sector and have benefited both the industries in terms of human resources needed for 





In the case of automobile industry, the decade of eighti s introduced internal 
competition through broadbanding and calibrated foreign collaborations in car, 
commercial vehicles and two wheeler segments, introducing products that are 
considered to be technologically superior within the market. Of the total 182 foreign 
collaborations approvals for the auto sector during 1982-91, as reported by Narayana 
and Joseph (1993), roughly 20% were financial, 70% pure technical and 10% design 
and drawing agreements; the number of collaborations were 32 and 150 for vehicle 
and component sectors. Apart from technical agreements with global majors, there 
were joint ventures with Japanese original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)-referred 
to as the ‘Japanisation’ phase (ACMA & SIAM, 2003). In the car segment the Govt. 
of India –Suzuki JV, Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) was set up; however, in the 1980s 
the government restricted entry, having anti-competitiv  implications. Of which, the 
sections within industry were quite critical. For the car and multi utility vehicles 
(MUVs) segments the 1990s represent, first of all, the entry of Indian private players 
Tata Motors (then TELCO) and Mahindra and Mahindra (M&M).  
 
Only from the mid-nineties many global players entered, mostly proposing initially to 
only assemble imported SKD / CKD kits (Auto Policy, 2002). ). For the balance of 
payments reason, the government in 1995 asked these companies to individually 
commit to an equivalent amount of exports (ICRA, 2003b). Although the policy of 
uncontrolled external liberalisation was gradually creeping in through the weakening 
of performance requirements, but due to the influence of strong local interests the 
1997 Auto Policy still required establishment of production facilities, not just 
assembly operations. Moreover, a new manufacturer of cars or MUVs had to commit 
by signing an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to achieve a minimum 
indigenisation of 50% by the 3rd year and 70% by the fifth year of the firm’s first 
consignment of CKD / SKD imports; and to commit to an equivalent value of total 
exports of vehicles and components, starting the third year of production, neutralising 
the foreign exchange spent on CKD / SKD imports during the currency of the MOU. 
Also for having operations as a subsidiary, new foreign entrants had to bring in at 
least $50 million. Eleven companies signed such MOUs with the government (auto 
Policy 2002). From April 1, 2001, quantitative restictions (QRs) were removed; SKD 
/ CKD and even completely built units (CBUs) imports of cars were put on the open 
general license (OGL) list, not requiring an import license any more; as announced in 
Jan. 2000, the foreign exchange neutrality requirement was lifted for new investors. 
The export commitments made under the MOU regime were abolished in August 
2002.  
 
Through the newly announced Auto Policy, 2002 the policy makers seek to establish a 
globally competitive auto industry in India-emergin as a global source of auto 
components and an Asian hub for export of small cars-and to double its contribution 
to the economy by 2010.  Although it is a big shift away from the earlier goal of 
encouraging the local manufacturing base for the development of autonomous Indian 
Auto industry coexisting the global majors in India, but consistent with the 
expectations of this paper it is not at all surprising that this shift has come about in 
200210. However, as per the theoretical framework of thispaper it is not difficult to 
                                               
10 Even earlier on account of the implementation of performance requirements the policy was 
compromised several times under pressure from the global majors. The incidences of explicit 
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foresee from the patterns of technology collaboratins, alliances and MNCs entry for 
the auto industry that in particular after 2002 theimpact would not be beneficial for 
the process of technological accumulation from the point of view of peoples’ needs. 
Neelam Singh (2004) also confirms this on the basis of her survey of the automobile 
industry. Higher ‘input import’ as well as ‘tech import’ propensities and a lower R&D 
intensity of foreign affiliates are observable from her survey results11.  
 
In the area of Auto R&D, there is the emergence of the trend of foreign firms like 
GM, Ford, Suzuki and Hyundai already choosing India for the outsourcing of 
engineering and design services. GM, Suzuki (Maruti) and Hyundai are starting R&D 
bases in India. Suzuki has decided to develop India as its only R&D hub for small 
cars in Asia outside Japan. GM’s engineering centre to develop automotive 
electronics and control systems and Ford’s software development centre in India 
would cater to their Asian operations. However, these trends have to be read along 
with the fact that the R&D intensity of Auto Components segment is still low. The 
R&D spending is still small-0.3% average R&D intensity during 2001-02 and 2002-
03 (Neelam Singh 2004). Among the Auto components producers the trend is towards 
international business, not exports alone. In recent y ars Amtek Auto, Sundaram 
Fasteners Ltd and Bharat Forge have acquired firms n US, UK and Germany to 
supply to global OEMs captive base.  
                                                                                                                            
performance requirements have been low for both the vehicles (+ engines) and components sectors. 
The performance requirements have been primarily as export obligations (EOs) and during the early 
period as a few cases of phased manufacturing plans (PMP) / import restrictions. The R&D and 
technology transfer requirements are few and rather trivial. There are no cases of ‘training of approvals 
technical collaborations for vehicles there is one each case of ‘no import of (none financial) faced any
performance requirements; among employees’ requirements. For the vehicles or engine manufacturing, 
during 1984, 1988 and 1991 only 7 foreign collaborati n capital goods’ allowed and ‘prototype of the 
vehicle to be tested by a specified institute’, loosely speaking, a case of technology transfer 
requirement. The 1992 to 1993 data list no performance requirements, except for a ‘50% FE’ vehicle 
firm to produce the latest models, a kind of technology transfer condition. A similar case is found 
during 1995 to 1997; additionally this firm faced EO and PMP requirements (and an explicit dividend 
balancing requirement). The 1998 to 2000 period is evoid of any explicit performance requirements. 
For the component sector, during ‘1984, 1988 and 1991’ period, 3 technical collaborations faced R&D 
obligations (all for1984), simply as having an in-house R&D facilities / program; a majority foreign 
collaboration was allowed import of capital goods only against foreign equity; post-1991, the 
imposition of performance requirements has been minimal, only a few cases of 100 (or 75%) export 
obligations (Eos) in the form of special cases. These are export-oriented units that have been taking an 
advantage of several associated benefits in export pr cessing zones. Her results also confirm that while 
the MOUs and export related commitments contributed positively to the development of local 
manufacturing base and ancillary development, the latt r developments of late nineties of no or weak 
performance requirements, permission for 100% FE, no minimum investment criteria specified for 
FDI, etc. did not seem to encourage value addition to the earlier extent.  
 
11 At present in India in the vehicle sector there arvery few joint ventures. For the car segment, in 
general, the local partner’s equity stake has been r duced to zero or an ineffective negligible level. The 
new 4-wheeler premium models are being introduced by MNEs in India almost invariably as CBUs or 
as CKDs, and the localization of their intermediates is expected to be slow. The earlier achieved high
degree of overall indigenisation of vehicle manufacturers is expected to fall for many firms. For the 
new vehicle models introduced in India by foreign affili tes, we are witness to the problem of high 
import dependence. The re-alignments of joint ventures has also taken place in the auto components 
sector, some technical collaborations have been turned into financial ones. As part of global mandating, 
though foreign automobile MNEs are likely to outsource increasingly some type of components 
through their affiliates / tie-ups here, yet it is o be kept in view that the increased export-output ratio of 




With the latest policy initiative (SIAM, September 2006) of the auto industry in which 
the government is a partner the global vision outlined strengthens the trends of global 
integration further. The Indian auto manufacturing is being integrated into an 
international division of labour where the domestic players from both automobile 
components segment as well as auto assemblers segment are also expected to 
internationalise their production system. While India is certainly going to be utilized 
as a manufacturing node, but whether this would allow the national system to leverage 
this initiative for the benefit of Indian transport system needs is an important policy 




In the case of pharmaceutical industry, right through the eighties and till very late in 
the nineties the policy of sectoral reservation wasin operation benefiting the domestic 
firms to grow in respect of capabilities for the production of generics. The strategy of 
export of generics is today providing quite a few of the large domestic firms over fifty 
percent of their sales turnover. In promoting the domestic generic industry, the Patent 
Act of 1970, which did not allow product patents in the area of pharmaceuticals, was 
a key instrument of calibrated protection. In India, it benefited the domestic firms a lot 
because the government combined the patent act with sectoral reservation, a key 
element in the drug policy of 1978.  
 
Under the Indian Patent Act, 1970 the country was free to develop alternate processes 
for the drugs that were still under product patent protection (on-patent drugs) in the 
developed countries. Several domestic firms came on the local market scene during 
the decade of eighties using the technologies for alte nate processes developed in-
house and by the CSIR laboratories. In the process, the CSIR got an opportunity to 
contribute to process chemistry and has over fifty new chemical reactions to her credit 
today. This shows that with the instruments of calibr ted protection in place the 
industry and research institutions got a chance to contribute to science and technology 
in generic terms. In this context, it would not be incorrect to point out that the 
advocates of liberalization characterized the R&D work undertaken by the CSIR and 
industry as reinventing the wheel and an unnecessary costly incremental minor 
innovation.  
 
With the implementation of the drug policy of 1978 the Indian Government had an 
effective public policy package consisting of sectoral reservation, incentives for the 
production of bulk drugs from basic stage, restrictions on FDI, etc., introduced for the 
benefit of the domestic pharmaceutical firms, which was in place till the early 
nineties. This package could enable the firms that had not been built by the big 
business but by the technical entrepreneurs to operate successfully to beat the barriers 
being erected by the multinational corporations in the Indian markets through their 
advertising investments and construction of the sals nd distribution networks. These 
firms got an opportunity to emerge as the viable suppliers of many of these drugs in 
the local Indian market. Today these firms are leaders in the domestic market. It 
would not be therefore wrong to state that their emergence and consolidation is a 
result of the support that these firms got from thestate in the form of protection 
through the patent legislation, sectoral reservation, price regulation protection, supply 
of talent developed within the public sector and publicly funded R&D support (Abrol, 
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1994). The advocates of liberalization were opposed to all of these measures. Thanks 
to the alternative framework of building the industry as a development block India 
was able to nurture the child of the state, which is again going awry because of the 
policy of external liberalization and deregulation being put in place since the mid 
nineties in India. 
 
2.7 Patterns of technology accumulation, innovation and peoples’ needs  
 
Now to relate the patterns of technological accumulation and innovation to the 
satisfaction of peoples’ needs, we will take again the cases of integration of Indian 
automobile and pharmaceutical industries to show how a distorted pattern of 
technological development is evolving on account of the absence of technological 
coordination and regulation of the new big business groups. The rules of market 
governance prevail and determine the S&T priorities.  
 
Automobile industry  
 
On account of the policy of calibrated protection that the governments followed till 
very recently, India has been to develop a number of pr ducers of components and 
some engine producers satisfying the international standards. The important question 
is that whether the network organisers from among the domestic firms would be able 
to bootstrap themselves technologically at the requi d pace. Vehicle manufacturers 
are moving into completely new raw materials and technologies, partly guided by 
environmental legislation. Supply chain is expected to be affected quite significantly 
by alternatives to all steel body, electric and hybrid power-trains, electronic control 
technologies, computerized engine control, on-board diagnostic, intelligent cruise 
control global navigation and satellite tracking systems. Two-wheeler firms are 
switching to the use of electronic fuel injection systems and four-stroke engines. Auto 
research is now focusing on alternatives to the intrnal combustion engine; the major 
areas of research are alternative fuels, electric vehicles and hybrid vehicles.  
 
It is not clear that whether in this new paradigm shift for what all segments the Indian 
Auto Assemblers would be able to position themselves as network organisers to 
dictate the technological directions. No major firm in India is presently working on 
fuel cells for scooters-a major auto segment for India. Similarly, the Indian firms are 
yet to accept the challenge of Euro IV norms in thecar segment. Even while 
recognizing the merit of such moves, the Auto Fuel Policy has essentially stayed away 
from recommending fuel economy regulations. It instead settled for a mandatory 
voluntary declaration of fuel economy for each model "to enable informed customer 
choice.  
 
The fact that such voluntary measures are not sufficient to sober intoxicating gas 
guzzling on Indian roads came to sharper focus recently when the Madras School of 
Economics and the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy submitted a report 
to the environment ministry proposing, ‘Taxes on Polluting Inputs and Outputs’. This 
report exposed how close we are to a worsening fuel economy. As of today, a large 
number of car models fall in the fuel economy range of 12-16 km/litre and their 
engine capacity ranges from 796 cc to 1800 cc, withmost models in the 796 cc to 
1400 cc range. But already a dramatic shift is evidnt towards mid engine capacity, a 
trend that is expected to only accelerate in the medium term. The 1000-1700 cc 
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segment is likely to dominate the Indian car market – already the combined share of 
the total sales in this segment has increased from 44.5 per cent in 2001 to 63.3 per 
cent in 2003. 
 
For the Indian legislative and policymaking bodies pushing for fuel-efficient vehicle 
technology, controlling gas-guzzlers on road, or reducing vehicles miles travelled are 
not even on the agenda. The August 2004 report of the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Petroleum and Natural Gas considers ethanol blends, driver-training 
programmes, and upgrading the garages of state public transport undertakings to 
improve fleet maintenance, as sufficient to conserve oil in the road transport sector. 
Even the recently-released, ‘India’s Initial National Communication’, drawn up by the 
ministry of environment and forests for the UNFCCC, as part of the government’s 
self-reporting on its efforts to lower carbon and energy intensity of the Indian 
economy, indulges only in cosmetic claims – we follow Euro II in some cities that is 
more energy efficient. The Centre for Science and Evironment (CSE, 2004) writes in 
its latest brief that resting the roost is the India  automobile industry, happy with the 
knowledge that it contributes 4.5 per cent to India’s GDP. It forgets to calculate the 
cost to the nation on account of not committing to a combined target of improving 
fuel economy and lowering emissions significantly.  
 
Indian cities in the grip of rapid motorisation and with cheap diesel prices are headed 
for the most harmful dieselisation of small car segm nt ever.  Successive stages of 
European standards, though tighter, are still lenient on diesel. Diesel vehicles are 
legally allowed to emit more NOx and PM compared to petrol vehicles – and this is 
the most serious of our worries. Euro II norms allow diesel cars to emit 40 percent 
more nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbon than the corresponding petrol cars. Even Euro 
IV norms allow diesel cars to emit 3 times more NOx than petrol counterpart. Instead 
of following Europe’s mistakes loyally, India must skip to avoid them quickly.  
 
It is quite clear that in the case of Auto industry the policy for industrial development 
needs an immediate integration with the introduction of appropriate auto emissions 
and fuels policy. Neither the policymakers nor the industry are ready as yet. However, 
under the policy of liberalisation the patterns of technological accumulation are 
becoming integrated with either the strategic behaviour of global majors or with the 
much less autonomous behaviour of Indian Auto firms who are also increasingly 
getting sucked into the patterns of global integration. The above discussion on auto 
industry makes to us one fact quite clear that the policy of competition and 
deregulation are in no way an answer to the introduction of appropriate innovation 




After the announcement of the Indian government to discuss the issue of norms and 
standards of the TRIPs Agreement as a part of the package to be arrived at in the 
GATT negotiations in 1990 and subsequent implementatio  of the TRIPS Agreement 
from 1995 there has occurred once again a major change in the conditions of 
competition or rivalry in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. First of all, for the 
multinational corporations (MNCs), which were so far losing the initiative to the 
domestic pharmaceutical firms in India, major opportunities are now available to them 
to grow again in both on and off-patent drugs. They have been freed from the 
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restrictions placed on them by the earlier drug policy of 1978. For example, the earlier 
policy had prevented them from entering in to the market as subsidiaries or branches 
if they did not choose to produce the bulk drug from the basic stage. Now this 
restriction has been withdrawn, and the multinational corporations are totally free to 
restructure their operations in India. Back with this freedom these companies are now 
under no obligation to produce the bulk drugs from the basic stage locally. As far as 
the supply of on-patent drugs after the implementation of TRIPS is concerned, there 
has been an expectation that rather than coming forward to locate the production of 
newer drugs in India the MNCs would like to import the on-patent drugs for the 
Indian market (Pharmabiz, 2000)12. Further, as over the years the import content of 
bulk drugs in the country (which is really technology intensive, as opposed to 
manufacture of formulations) has also shown a rising trend (in terms of imports of 
bulk drugs as percent of total availability (in Rs. 10 million) already stands at 50 
percent) concerns with regard to the emerging level of competitiveness of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry for the new products are requi d to be assessed by the 
policymakers.  
 
It is not only the MNCs that have increased the imports the domestic formulators are 
even resorting to imports. Therefore, several small-sca e units in the Indian bulk drug 
industry are facing a serious threat to their existnce13. The bulk drug units without a 
formulation activity on their own, have been under tr mendous pressure of price war 
in the domestic market, which has forced them to get into either exports where the 
global quality standards are to be met or quitting the business once for all. The 
abundant supply, low demand from domestic formulation companies for the local 
made drugs and dumping of imported drugs have together contributed to this chaotic 
market situation and the result is uncertainty in the industry14 (Pharmabiz, 2002).  
 
Evidence is growing in favour of the fact that in the immediate future, Indian 
pharmaceutical firms are increasingly looking for such tie-ups where their domestic 
facilities will be used for outsourcing of both R&D and manufacture rather than for 
serving the domestic market based needs of essential medicines. Indian companies are 
looking forward to leverage upon the advantages of cheap manufacturing and R&D 
costs to build their linkages with MNCs. They are interested to concentrate on the task 
of upgrading for entry into large Northern generic markets. They have little interest in 
satisfying the domestic markets of essential medicines within the country. It is true 
that it is not possible for the domestic firms to cntinue anymore their expansion 
using the earlier route to growth in the Indian market. Large domestic firms like the 
Ranabaxy, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Wockhardt, Sun Pharma, Cadilla, Cipla, Lupin 
and some others have made the choice of arriving in the global market as a major 
                                               
12 Inexpensive or monopoly imports of finished formulations are rising in menacing proportions into 
India, forcing even the leading domestic drug companies to concede that the threat of import 
liberalization under WTO is for real in this knowledge-based. Formulation imports by drug MNCs 
touch Rs 900 cr in 9 months; Eli Lilly and Novartis exceed Rs 40 cr sale each in one product  
December 11, 2000 
13 The industry also alleges that though the imports f bulk drugs through official channel have slowed 
down in the past 2-3 years, the dumping and smugglin  of drugs are rampant at present. This also has 
caused huge price discounts in the domestic market. (N ws archive of Pharmabiz, 2001 
14 Domestic pharmaceutical industry output is expected to exceed Rs 260 billion in the financial year 
2002. The bulk drugs will account for only Rs 54 billion i.e. 21 per cent and formulations the 
remaining Rs 210 billion with 79 per cent. However, the exports of Pharmaceuticals continue to grow 
especially in the bulk drug segment on account of the emergence of contract manufacturing. 
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source of exports of off-patent generic drugs (in the form of formulations) to the 
markets of developed world. During the post-TRIPS period as a result a trend is also 
on the rise to show that the balance of trade in pharma sector is now becoming 
favourable. The Indian industry is shown to be therefore in good health (Aggarwal, A, 
2004).  
 
To come to the patterns of investment by MNCs, the newer investments of MNCs 
were largely for the expansion of formulation activity. Newer investments in the bulk 
drug were few and far between. Further, we expect the post-2005 situation to create 
certainly far more permissive environment for imports, for a larger number of product 
segments pharmaceutical MNCs would have increased op rating freedom to shift to 
import based production. Their preference for the establishment of new operations 
through the incorporation of wholly owned subsidiaries is also a key feature of the 
new situation.  
 
Quite a large part of the new FDI in pharmaceuticals has been devoted for the benefit 
of mergers, acquisitions and takeovers to facilitate the parent firms to increase their 
control over the operations located in India. Globa mergers have affected the foreign 
pharmaceutical industry on familiar lines. Stronger control over the ownership of 
investments continues to be the main driver of merger and acquisition activity for the 
pharmaceutical MNCs in India. The government has been made to relax its laws with 
regard to the control of foreign direct investment. For example, earlier the Indian 
government used to grant permission for the establihment of 100% wholly own 
subsidiaries only on the condition that the industry would be willing to take up the 
production of pharmaceuticals right from the basic stage of manufacture of bulk drugs 
involved. This is no longer a requirement; it shows that the foreign pharmaceutical 
firms have been able to improve their bargaining position to a considerable extent 
after the introduction of TRIPs.  
 
The claimed benefit of increased technology transfer is also yet to accrue to the 
domestic pharmaceutical firms. Narsalay (2000) shows that during 1991-99 the total 
number of technical collaboration approvals in the p armaceutical industry were 187, 
which formed 3.1 percent of all the technical collaboration agreements approved 
during this period. For a high technology sector like pharmaceuticals it is quite a low 
figure. In the industry, however, there is an expectation that the number of technical 
collaborations will increase only when a product patent regime comes into place in 
2005. Dhar and Rao (2002) suggest that so far foreign technical collaborations have 
not been important for export; they conjecture thatonly many small and medium scale 
firms have entered into collaborations with foreign firms mostly to cater to the 
domestic market. Nevertheless, it is still true that in India like everywhere the full-
blown impact of TRIPs Agreement on technology transfer and FDI quality in the 
pharmaceutical industry is yet to take shape.  
 
Most analysts are also of the view that the Agreement on TRIPs has not been able to 
succeed in inducing the foreign firms to take up more f overseas R&D in the 
developing countries. Upadhyay, Ray and Basu (2002) indicate the same about the 
composition of R&D on the basis of a survey undertaken for the Department of 
Science and Technology; they suggest that generally R&D activities undertaken by 
subsidiaries of MNC are minimal. Whatever little R&D they undertake, relatively 
more thrust is placed by them on formulation R&D (or product development) 
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compared to bulk drug R&D (or process development). Some adaptive R&D is there 
for trouble-shooting. Their focus is on conventional dosage forms. Although few of 
them manufacture novel drug delivery system, no research on NDDS is undertaken at 
the subsidiaries.  
 
In those cases where some MNCs had located part of their global R&D outfit in India, 
activities have been on the decline. Barring Hoechst and Astra, who do limited drug 
discovery work here, others have closed down the units. Earlier Ciba-Geigy had larger 
presence in R&D; its R&D centre is now closed in India. Hoechst has also been 
reducing its involvement in R&D in India. Their current strategy is to reduce the local 
in-house R&D investment in India and build on the work already done on natural 
products in Europe. Current expectations are that the MNCs will prefer to selectively 
invest in those R&D operations like bioinformatics and clinical research where by 
relocation it is possible for them to cut down the R&D costs without increasing 
information spillovers. Available evidence from India suggests that in many cases the 
MNCs appear to have preferred the route of outsourcing of R&D from fully dedicated 
companies to reduce costs in respect of clinical tri ls and bioinformatics related R&D 
work. Presently only for the healthcare management and pharmaceutical services the 
choice of MNCs has been to establish fully owned R&D subsidiaries. Establishment 
of operations for the implementation of clinical trials, data management and bio-
statistics by Quintiles, a leading pharmaceutical service provider, is an example.  
 
Looking at the domestic sector today, only a handful o  firms have been able to 
increase their R&D investments. The budgetary increase is of the order of about 1-2% 
of sales to 5-6% of sales in the past few years. However, it may also be mentioned 
that the big business groups do not want to engage in autonomous drug development 
activity and is interested in selling its rights to the partners abroad for the reason that 
it does not have the capacity to invest further andstopping after the stage of drug 
discovery work. Nevertheless, all the developments that we see in respect of the 
development of drug discovery capabilities within the Indian firms are largely 
directed to the needs of the western markets today. However, the question is even if 
the TRIPs Agreement is going to take these firms into largely the direction of 
undertaking production and innovation for the lifestyle disease oriented markets, but 
can we expect the locally bred Indian firms to participate competitively in the exercise 
of independent pharmaceutical innovation. This is mainly because given their present 
scales as well as the size of domestic markets where t y are embedded, locally bred 
firms of developing countries, are certainly not capable of moving independently in 
respect of the lifestyle diseases in the western markets.  
 
The factor of small size of market continues to be a constraint for the domestic 
pharmaceutical firms, in addition they are being blocked everywhere by the MNCs. 
Strong IPRs remain one of the most important institutional change of last decade that 
the Indian policymakers can expect to come in the way of local companies. Their 
adverse effect on the size of market for local firms has to be suitably alleviated. 
Markets for knowledge and technology are by no means neutral space; policy 
interventions for industrial upgrading have to take in to account that there is an 
international division of labour being constituted through the route of outsourcing. 
Since the latest trap is to get the domestic firms to accept the role of junior partners in 
the new game of protemics and genomics based innovation wherein the R&D 
platform / tools are already monopolised via the route of strong IPRs, the patent law 
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should be suitably formulated to provide space for R&D suited to local needs. In 
addition, it seems that prospects for domestic R&D for the benefit of Indian people as 
a whole would improve only under the conditions where the constraint of market size 
has been suitably eased for the benefit of local phrmaceutical firms through the 
increase in health expenditure. In the recent period the health expenditure has been 
declining across the board in India. This is a direct consequence of the 
implementation of neo-liberal fiscal strategy.  
 
The case of Indian pharmaceutical industry is quite instructive. It has been identified 
as an island of efficiency by the policymakers in the S&T sphere. It is the new big 
business groups that are technologically specialised n the pharmaceutical industry. 
But even their development under the rules of market governance shows that the 
policy of competition (instead read rivalry) and deregulation are in no way of any help 
if the country wants to realize the appropriate healt  goals and patterns of 
technological accumulation. Domestic firms have been getting incentivised for 
inappropriate product targets and cannot be made to enhance their efforts on the real 
Indian needs. There exists an experience of the world ide practice of wasteful 
‘negative’ innovation emanating from the pharmaceutical sector under the strategy of 
‘innovation for profit’. In particular, the Indian policymakers have a social 
responsibility to use the instruments of public sector R&D and governmental support 
for innovation to the private sector in a targeted way to ensure that the institutions of 
health sciences remain geared to producing more of public goods rather than market 
goods. 
Section 3 Influence on the orientation and character of national level S&T  
 
3.1 Consequences for the publicly-funded RTD structures  
During the period of reforms, if we compare the trend of the national R&D 
expenditure with the world trend the performance of national RTD structures was 
highly disappointing in India15. But what is equally important to note that much of the 
enhanced allocations went to the departments relating to defense, nuclear energy and 
space. Civilian R&D priorities continue to be neglected. Be the state sector R&D or 
the user departments R&D their allocations have been made to suffer. There has been 
virtually no increase in the user department allocati ns. The annual budget on R&D 
relating to health, communicable disease control, nutrition and family welfare put 
together is only around Rs. 3500 million. Compare this figure with the spending of 
Rs. 25000 million for defence R&D and Rs. 8000 million on atomic energy R&D. 
R&D in meteorology, an area that is critical to agriculture, irigation, flood control, 
drinking water and disaster prediction is only about Rs. 1300 million. Put together 
even today the outlays for botanical and Zoological surveys (that are responsible for 
biodiversity assessment and protection in the country) are of order of merely Rs. 300 
million. In 1974-79 the combined outlays to atomic energy and space were 18% of 
total (Rs. 3000 million). Indian Council of Agricult ral Research (ICAR) and Council 
of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) together came also to the same level of 
allocation. Today the atomic energy and space are rec iving around 35% of total S&T 
budget. The share of agencies of ICAR & CSIR in total S&T allocation has fallen to 
around 22%.  
                                               
15 The national R&D expenditure as a proportion of GNP rose for the world from 1.85 percent in 1980 
to 2.5 percent in 1990s. The proportion of national resources spent on R&D by India declined steadily 
from a peak of 0.91 percent in 1986-87 to 0.71 in 1995-96. Although under the last government the 
ratio has increased back to 0.81 percent in 1998-99 (Government of India, 2002).  
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Publicly funded R&D institutions continue to account for the bulk of R&D 
expenditure in India with industry spending only 28percent of national R&D 
expenditure. The decline in the proportion of national R&D expenditure was mainly 
due to the budgetary squeeze. Even the rate of growth f R&D expenditure in industry 
declined in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. R&D expenditure fell in 12 out of 28 
broad industries in the 1990s and even where it rose, the R&D to sales ratios 
stagnated or declined.  
 
Industrial Research and Development Expenditure in (10 million Rupees) and 
Its Percentage of Sales Turnover in brackets for leading industry groups  
 

















































































Source: Department of Science & Technology 
3.2 Shaping of the publicly funded civilian industrial research  
Take the example of the Council of Scientific & Industrial Research-the largest 
civilian R&D agency of India. Goals set for the year of 2001 were to move towards 
the path of self financing by generating over Rs.7 billion from external sources, as 
against Rs.1.35 billion in 1994-95, of which at least 50% will be from industrial 
customers (up from 15% in 1994-95); develop at least ten exclusive and globally 
competitive technologies in niche areas; hold a patent bank of 500 foreign patents (up 
from 50); realize 10% of operational expenditure from intellectual property licensing 
(up from < 1%); and derive annual earnings of $ 40 million from overseas R&D work 
and services (up from < $ 2 million). 
 
Over two-thirds of the council’s income continued to come from budgetary support. 
External cash flows continued to account for only about one fifth and this has 
remained more or less around the same level over the period of last one and half 
decade. Government (budgetary support plus contract revenue from government 
agencies as grants-in-aid) continued to be the major source of finance accounting for 
over 80 percent. The amount of cash generated from the industry continued to about 
25 percent of the external cash flows (or about 6 percent of   total receipts) and that 
too has not shown much variation across the years. Foreign earnings do not work out 
to be more than 1.7 per cent. 
 
The vision 2001 envisaged that CSIR would hold a valuable portfolio of at least 1000 
Indian patents and 500 foreign patents. It is well known that the propensity to patent 
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also differs considerably among R&D organizations ad inventors. However, the 
policymakers were insistent to get the CSIR as a whole to be measured by patenting 
activity. The Council has been successful in securing 591 Indian patents and 101 
foreign ones cumulatively (CSIR, 2001). Available evid nce also tells us that much of 
it is accounted for by a select set of five laboratries.  
 
The ‘Big Five’ CSIR Laboratories based on performance during 1999-02 for 















CIMAP 68 1 38 7 31 25 
IICT 32 6 72 4 92 17 
NCL 18 12 63 16 43 16 
CDRI 16 0 8 6 27 6 
IICB 3 1 18 0 9 5 
Total-CSIR 199 35 452 56 580 86 
 
Poor CSIR performers from 1999-2002, for patents granted abroad  









CBRI 0 0 0  
CCMB 0 1 0  
CEERI 0 0 1  
CMRI 0 1 0  
CSIO 0 0 0  
CSMCRI 0 0 0  
IMT 0 1 0  
NAL 0 0 0  
NBRI 0 0 1  
NGRI 0 0 0  
NIO 0 0 0  
NML 0 0 0  
RRL (BHU) 0 0 0  
RRL (BHO) 0 0 0  
RRL (JM) 0 0 0  
 
Gupta (2004) has analysed the whole count data of Indian patent output of 2880 
(1978-2000) inventors who produced 6877 patents in India. Of these, 62 (2%) 
inventors produced 1225 patents (18%) patents, 691 (24%) inventors produced 4166 
(61%) patents and 2189 (76%) inventors produced only 2711 (39%). The patenting in 
US by inventors from CSIR also tells a similar pattern. There are 461 inventors who 
produced 7555 patents in US. Analysis indicates that again 19 inventors (4%) 
produced 155 patents (20%), a highly skewed concentrat d pattern of inventor 
propensity. There are 48 (10%) inventors who produce  227 (30%) patents while 413 
(90%) inventors produced 528 (70%) patents. Gupta (2006) also observes that though 
scientists in CSIR use higher inputs of scientific nformation than the technical 




Provisional figures from CSIR claim to indicate by its own admission that in the last 
five years, only 4% of patents in force have been licensed. Compare this achievement 
with the target of 10% of operational expenditure of CSIR to be realized from 
intellectual property. The above described record of failure of the CSIR 2001 Vision 
and Strategy is yet another fact of the liberalisation period.  
 
The strategy contained a whole range of misapplied targets, to which the CSIR system 
could not be expected to respond favourably. The vision and strategy talked of 
globalising the CSIR system, making it as a global pl tform of R&D. It talked of 
‘patent or perish’, when we know that for several prts of the system it was a 
misapplied target. It had put in too much faith in the market forces, but there was very 
little favourable response. It went on to withdraw from the societal missions, where 
the strengths of CSIR system were highly applicable.    
 
The primary function of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is 
to undertake R&D directed towards continuous improvement of indigenous 
technology and adaptation and development of imported technology. But during the 
period of his tenure this primary function failed to receive the support of CSIR 
leadership. Take the available evidence in this regard from the report of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG, Report No.5 of 2003). This CAG 
Report tells that of the 984 technologies developed by 23 laboratories/institutes 607 
technologies, including 247 developed before 1996-97, were yet to be transferred. It 
also informs that these laboratories were unable to furnish specific information on the 
actual expenditure on the development of technologies. Reasons for non-transfer of 
246 developed technologies showed that 77 technologies were not found fit for 
transfer, while 87 required further improvements/developments. Besides, in 82 cases 
including 34 developed prior to 1999-2000, the negotiations for transfer were under 
way. CSIR sustained loss of Rs 99.31 lakh due to violation of its guidelines on 
technology transfer. Royalty/premia of Rs 134.58 lakh remained unrealised in 17 
cases of technology transfer. 
 
During the decade of eighties there was at least an attempt to reposition the CSIR for 
the objective of development of technologies for societal missions and rural 
industrialisation.  Efforts were initiated in respect of several technology missions. 
During the decade of nineties the structures created for the same purpose were 
dismantled. In the year 2000, the management even closed down the Division of 
Societal and Technology Missions (STMD), a nodal point set up for the coordination 
of this work in the CSIR.  
 
Publicly funded institutions have a very important role to play in technology transfer 
to the marginal groups. But they continue to lack in the contacts with the bridging 
organisations. To establish an effective connection with the resources and 
opportunities available to the poor the CSIR organiz tions would need the help of 
bridging organisations. In the absence of this connection technologies that these 
organizations have created are having a very littlesuccess among the rural and urban 
poor. A complete failure of the policy of liberalisation is evident in the field of 




Transfer and Development of Technologies in CSIR Laboratories 
Technologies Sr. 
No. 
Name of Laboratory/ Institute 
Developed Transferred Lying un-transferred 
1. 
Central Building Research Institute 
(CBRI) 
92 81 11 
2. 
Centre for Biochemical Technology 
(CBT) 
23 10 13 
3. 
Centre for Cellular and Molecular 
Biology (CCMB) 
05 02 03 
4. 
Central Food Technology Research 
Institute (CFTRI) 
133 27 106 
5. 
Central Glass & Ceramics Research 
Institute (CGCRI) 
31 11 20 
6. 
Central Institute of Medicinal & 
Aromatic Plants (CIMAP) 
27 17 10 
7. 
Central Leather Research Institute 
(CLRI) 
65 04 61 
8. 
Central Road Research Institute 
(CRRI) 
49 25 24 
9. 
Central Salt & Marine Chemicals 
Research Institute (CSMCRI) 
28 09 19 
10. 
Indian Institute of Chemical Biology 
(IICB) 
33 02 31 
11. 
Indian Institute of Chemical 
Technology (IICT) 
150 130 20 
12. 
Industrial Toxicological Research 
Centre ( ITRC) 
08 04 04 
13. 
National Aerospace Laboratories 
(NAL) 
05 - 05 
14. 
National Botanical Research 
Institute (NBRI) 
50 03 47 
15. 
National Chemical Laboratory 
(NCL) 
NA NA NA 
16. 
National Environmental 
Engineering Research Institute 
(NEERI) 
37 - 37 
17. 
National Geophysical Research 
Institute (NGRI) 
04 01 03 
18. 
National Metallurgical Laboratory 
(NML) 
35 20 15 
19. 
National Physical Laboratory 
(NPL) 
49 11 38 
20. 
Regional Research Laboratory 
Bhopal RRL-Bho. 
15 07 08 
21. 
Regional Research Laboratory 
Bhuvneshwar (RRL-Bhu)  
112 - 112 
22. 
Regional Research Laboratory 
Jammu (RRL-J) 
14 05 09 
23. 
Regional Research Laboratory 
Trivandrum (RRL-T) 
19 08 11 
Total 984 377 607 
3.3 Publicly funded research and transfer of technology 
 
Technology transfer to industry requires two hands to meet to obtain success is a 
known stylised fact of S&T policy studies. For the advocates of liberalization the 
example of new technologies such as biotechnology, advanced materials, information 
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technology etc., are cases of major innovations where after the reforms one expects 
the success rate to be higher than before. In this sub ection, we discuss the evidence 
accumulating in the case of transfer of biotechnology (BT). Analysis undertaken by 
Visalakshi (2006) suggests that change for the better is yet to occur; a high amount of 
failures continue in the case of transfer of biotechnologies. Out of the 60 cases studied 
only 10-12 cases reached commercial stage. Many of the companies which received 
the technologies are big companies leaving only a handful of new/small companies 
which also tried to commercialise BT. Visalakshi (2006) suggests that it is also 
notable from the analysis that low end and traditional BT propositions face less 
difficulties during TT in both the periods, that is between 86-95 and 96-05. The high 
end biotechnology propositions faced difficulties which required high capability to 
adapt and further develop and commercialise, larger investments in infrastructure and 
skills, more clear regulatory requirements and favourable and supportive policy 
instruments and development and promotion of market. Further, Visalakshi (2006) 
also confirms that though during the period between 96-05 though the technical 
problems were overcome in many cases but the failures persist in the sphere of 
investment and regulatory policy, which the state has not been able to sort out due to 
pressures by different interest groups.  
 
In another study on linkages and commercialisation of healthcare biotechnology, 
Visalashi (2006) reports the data collected from 80 companies that were surveyed by 
her during the period of 2003-04. She again confirms the lack of major changes in 
respect of industry and indicates that the companies, which are having linkages with 
academic institutions or other companies are less than 50 percent of all the companies 
surveyed. She also points out that there are many schemes initiated by government 
agencies but lack of awareness of these and conditis for utilising these schemes 
have made them less used by the target companies. Added to this some of the cultural 
and organizational ethos have also come in the way of utilizing the skills, know-how 
and infrastructure available in public research andcademic research to be optimally 
used for successful innovation and commercialisation of healthcare biotechnology 
products in India.  
 
3.4 Opening up of the national S&T system to MNCs 
The national S&T policy was radically modified to open up the publicly funded 
structures of research and development (R&D) and technology assimilation to the 
force of force capital for a wide range of policy objectives. Foreign companies were 
invited to freely access the publicly funded R&D inst tutions through the mechanism 
of contract work. The current policy is to freely permit the foreign companies to set 
up R&D facilities and venture capital funds in the country for the benefit of 
development of R&D and technology development. All of these have a totally new set 
of strategic implications for the processes of integration of research and development 
(R&D) in to industry.  
 
During this period the new feature introduced in the Indian S&T system is 'R&D by 
MNCs'. This trend however also posits a lot of potential for mischief. See Box 4. 
 35 
BOX 5 
S&T INSTITUTIONS AND LOCAL 
INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIP 
• Income from royalty and premia for the CSIR 
laboratories remains a small component.  
• For the CSIR laboratories consultancy continues to be 
still the main source of income from private sector units.  
• Pressure for raising the external cash flow Exists:  CSIR 
to needed more than 2000 projects to Meet Its External 
Cash Flow Needs. 
• This Put Tremendous Pressure on the System in Which 
only 5000 Scientists were working having Negative 
Consequences for CSIR Systems and its Coherence. 
BOX 4 
R&D BY FOREIGN COMPANIES 
SOME PROMINENT INSTANCES OF R&D FEEDING INTO 
MONOPOLIES 
• Indal works for Alcan. 
• Ciba-Giegy has Tie up with Hoechest and Winds up R&D 
Operations after Screening Natural Products. 
SOME CSIR-MNC TIE UPS 
• Duponts for identification of Molecules and Drugs. 
• Park Davis for Supply of Medicinal Plants. 
• Abbot Labs for Sythesis of Organic Molecules. 
• General Electric Company for Intermediate for 
PolyCarbonates. 
SOME IMPORTANT QUESTIONS 
• Are Emerging Links with Foreign Companies helping to 
Upgrade Indigenous R&D? 
• Whether the Needs of National Institutions are met hrough 
these Collaborations: While IIT’s Tie Up with IBM i s Strong 
on Resource Generation, It is weak in respect of Collaboration. 
• Will Local Industry be Adversely Affected if R&D is Used by 
MNC’s to Enhance their own Competitive Advantage? 
• Are Forward Looking Linkages Generated through 
Collaborations between Industry and Publicly Funded 
Institutions or Would they Lock out Local Industry Under the 
New IPR Regime? 
• Would this Policy take Us Away from the Problems of 
Modernisation of the Existing Labs and Lock them into a 
Linkage Regime, which has as narrow a focus as it had 
It is integrating the leading parts of Indian S&T capacity into the regime of global 
R&D whose benefits 
from the viewpoint of 
the national interests 
are small and the costs 
can be quite large. The 
emerging tendency of 




extensions of the global 
network of 
multinational 
corporations is unlikely 
to have any major spill 
over. Attracted by the 
cheap scientific labour 
and the scientific and 
technological 
infrastructure built up 
as a result of decades of 
planning, to an extent 
multinationals have 
been always making 
use of the available 
opportunities.  
Under the post-1991 liberalisation 
policy regime the foreign 
companies are being allowed direct 
access to the national R&D system. 
Today the foreign companies 
appear to be better placed than the 
national companies in respect of the 
access to S&T infrastructure. This 
means that the forces in S&T 
infrastructure which so far drove 
S&T in India will be either put on 
to the co-option road or driven to 
become extinct by its new policies. 
The country has been induced to 
open up the national laboratories to 
the foreign companies for contract research in those fields where the Indian 
companies' interests are highest.  
 
It is significant that the CSIR institutions have been induced to get into the 
collaborative arrangements with foreign companies in those sectors where the 
strategic interests of the Indian industry are high. T is option has been preferred by 
the CSIR partly because it has been constantly for the last two decades under heavy 
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criticism for not being able to hit big in the area of indigenous technology 
development. But this is hardly a good way of proving itself as the process of putting 
these institutions into foreign contracts can also hurt the national system of 
innovation. Even in this latest phase of the post liberalisation regime the collaborative 
R&D programmes in which publicly funded laboratories would be partnering with the 
local industry are still a far cry as shown in Box 5. 
 
3.5 Failure in respect of articulation of demand for indigenous S&T 
 
The government can use the publicly funded R&D institutions in a bigger way if it 
sees itself also as a creator of demand in the areaof indigenous technology 
development. Let us not forget that it is only in areas such as agricultural research, 
space, atomic energy and defence research where strong, often non-economic demand 
inducement mechanisms of the government were at work that significant advances 
took place. For science and technology (S&T) the period of economic liberalisation 
has been a period of the system coming face to face with its continuing weak links 
with the people’s needs and resources. Throughout te period the consequences of its 
systemic failures have recurrently come home to the nation. In respect of many 
important sectors there has been an open expression of dissatisfaction with the 
solutions and services provided to by the structures of S&T among the state 
governments. Within electronic and print media S&T has been under close scrutiny 
for the technologies of weather forecasts and the solutions that the S&T institutions 
recommend for the control of floods and drought. In some cases the source of trouble 
identified has been those very solutions that business and institutions continue to 
impose on the people in the name of latest technologies. The available technology 
implementing structures are not at all competent to ackle the problems of rising 
import dependence on petroleum products, growing incidence of severe outbreaks of 
crop diseases, explosion in the recurrence of communicable diseases, worsening water 
and air pollution and other such issues that affect the poor. This has also sent out a 
message that the problems of restructuring of S&T are certainly not an issue of only 
funding or better integration and co-ordination among different experts but also of its 
reorientation. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the national innovation 
system is being induced to take one step further in the direction of disconnection’s of 
S&T system with the people’s needs and resources. The government is negligent of 
the concerns relating to impacts of the introduction of new technologies on self-
reliance, equity, employment, health and safety of people. Across sectors the question 
of “new technology for whom” is being ignored in the implementation of the policies 
formulated on technology import, intellectual property rights and biodiversity 
conservation, agricultural development, energy, transport and education. 
 
Even in respect of IT though at the level of policy perspective the government has 
been laying much stress yet the irony is that the increases in budgetary allocation have 
been myopic. The government took the step of setting up of the Ministry of 
Information Technology (MIT) on 15th October 1999 with many fanfares.  The 
objectives given to the Ministry for fulfilment were quite ambitious. The Ministry is 
to accelerate the Internet revolution in India, emphasizing the creation of useful 
contents in Indian languages, IT-enabled services, IT education, electronics and 
computer hardware manufacturing, and exports, silicon facility, e-commerce and 
Internet based enterprises. As a nodal mechanism the Ministry has been entrusted the 
task of implementation of a comprehensive action plan to make India an IT 
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Superpower in the early part of the next century and chieve a target of $ 50 billion in 
software exports by 2000. Since the Ministry has been designated as the nodal 
institutional mechanism for facilitating all the init ative in the Central Government, 
the State Government, Academia the Indian private sector and successful Indian IT 
professionals abroad, it was natural to expect that i s budget would be considerably 
enhanced.  
 
The report issued by the Parliamentary Standing Committee is quite illuminating on 
the details of the myopia that follows from the incremental budgetary approach. Its 
finding is that though the allocation for the year 2000-2001 is Rs. 197.20 Crores more 
than of 1999-2000 but this enhancement is largely a consequence of the merger of 
National Informatics Centre (NIC) and Electronics and Computer Software Export 
Promotion Council (ESC) into the Department of Electronics (DOE). It reveals in 
detail about how even this year the increase in alloc tion to IT is marginal. It reports 
that the allocation for NIC would be utilised mainly towards its on-going activities. 
The Committee states that it has failed to understand how NIC will catch up with 
rapid advances being made in this field as a result of technical innovations. The 
Committee observes that the Ministry should review ts priorities and if necessary, 
come out with additional financial projections at Revised Estimates (R.E.) stage.  
 
The same Committee also notes that the Technology Development Council (TDC) 
programme aiming to support research, design, development and engineering in the 
areas of computer and computer communications, control and instrumentation, 
consumer electronics, telecommunications and broadcasting has not been able to use 
even its meagre provision of Rs. Eight Crores. The same is again repeated for the 
Industrial Electronics Promotion Programme (IEPP) that aims at development and 
application of Electronics &Information Technology based products and systems to 
improve productivity, quality and safety in the industrial sector. The Committee asks 
the Ministry to ensure proper co-ordination between the Ministry and the executing 
organisations so that the dismal performance of the past regarding non-execution of 
projects is not repeated. The Committee also notes with great concern that hardware 
sector is showing reverse trends and as such has made little progress. It therefore 
recommends, the Ministry should endeavour to bridge the gap between hardware and 
software sectors by chalking out concrete plans for speedy promotion and 
development of hardware export in the country. In a sceptical tone, the Committee 
also notes of the slow progress made in the important department’s programme 
entitled “Electronics for Rural/Social/Agricultural/Water Sector”. The Committee 
feels that the Ministry should utilise the allocation for the programme for the benefit 
of maximum number of rural people 
 
3.6 Patterns of S&T investments by user departments 
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BOX 6 
DECLINE IN USER DEPARTMENTS’ R&D 
No increase in S&T for Sectoral and Regional 
needs 
• S&T allocation of less than 1% in the 
Ministries of Coal, Power and Rural 
Development, and less than 0.1% by the 
Railway Ministry. 
•  The States and the Union Territories, all put 
together, had 8th Plan outlay of less than Rs. 
200 Crores for science and technology during 
the whole plan period of 5 years. 
• The percentage allocation of Agricultural Gross 
Domestic Product for Agricultural Research 
and Education by the developing and developed 
countries: 0.5% and 2.39% respectively in Last 
5 Years. 
• Agricultural Research and Education In India: 
Investment was 0.28 % and 0.128% for the 
years 1997-98 and 1998-99 (Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Agricultural).   
• Parliamentary Committee recommends outlay 
for DARE/ICAR in the IXth Plan to the level of 
1% of agricultural GDP.  
• This year the Committee noted that increase in 
plan expenditure is mere 9.77%, which is far 
from adequate, and it has again strongly 
reiterated its earlier recommendation of 
increasing the allocation to agricultural 
The approach to budgetary allocation for most of the S&T budgets of user 
departments has remained one of 
incremental increases in the non-
plan. See Box 6 for the state of 
User departments R&D during the 
nineties. 
 
3.7 Human resources for S&T 
under liberalisation  
For a balanced development of the 
national system of innovation for a 
country like India it is quite critical 
that the support provided by the 
government to the sector of 
universities and technical 
institutions does not suffer due to 
financial constraints. Plan funding 
for the development of higher 
education has not increased in 
proportion to increase in allocation 
of funds to allocation. The plan 
allocation during the IX plan is 
slightly less than eight percent. 
Over the period 1990-97 the share 
of expenditure on Higher 
Education to total expenditure on 
Education both by Central and 
State has declined successively 
from 14.7% to 11.5%. The decline is greater in the case of Central Sector i.e. from 
32.2% to 15.7%.  Expenditure on Higher Education as % of GNP has gone down 
considerably. It is less than one half of what was in 1981. Most of students enrolled in 
higher education are pursuing the traditional programmes of studies, i.e. arts, science 
and commerce, which in fact are least cost programmes as compared to other 
professionals and vocational oriented programmes. The priority shifts in favour of 
revenue generating courses and short duration education and crash courses are visible. 
The budgets on libraries, laboratories and similar facilities are severely affected.   The 
central government’s plan expenditure on research by Department of Education has 
come down in a very big way. Research in technical education has suffered severely. 
The fine distinction between higher education and training is getting lost. 
 
There is a decline in the availability of manpower capable of taking up R&D. Apart 
from viable financial support the most critical input for R&D is manpower. While 
India has a large strength of S&T personnel of over 6.3 million, the number of 
scientists actually engaged in R&D is only about 150,000. The government must 
make investments in S&T to attract students back to the post-graduate studies in 
science and engineering. A clear drop in enrolment in basic sciences is visible. The 
percentage of those students who take up basic science as their course declined from 
30% to 19.6% in a matter of three decades. In the field of post-graduate education and 
research in engineering and technology the situation is equally worrisome. The 
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average turnout of Master's Degree holders in enginer g and technology is only 
around 5000 per year and this is against the capacity of more than 15000.  
 
To save the situation the concept of an assured placement to the doctorates and post-
graduates in engineering and science is now necessary. Otherwise it seems that this 
decline will continue. There is nothing in the last three budgets to give a feeling that 
the government now understands the problems and is willing to invest in a big way in 
R&D and higher education. With the increase in fellowship money, which followed 
the recommendations of the fifth pay commission, the government should have also 
increased the grant to UGC and CSIR if it was serious about encouraging the agencies 
to provide more fellowships so as the trend of declining enrolment is reversed. The 
funds provided to these agencies are not even sufficient to maintain the existing level 
of fellowships. These agencies have been forced to reduce the number of fellowships.  
There is no change in the pattern of funding to the educational institutions. They are 
likely to consume their allocation mostly in the payment of salaries. It means that the 
impact of increased salaries will not get translated into making an impact on the 
students getting attracted to the careers in engineering and science. There will be 
hardly any money left to support R&D in the institutions after the payment of salaries. 
The initiatives that the CSIR and DST have been promoting in respect of encouraging 
young talents to take up research oriented careers as a tokenism are insufficient to 
counter the tendencies of young minds getting attracted to IT-a big brain sink at 
present. The last available out-turn data for doctorate degree holders reveals that from 
95-96 to 96-97 there has been a drop in the science faculty from 3861-3498 and in the 
engineering faculty from 374 to 298 respectively. A known fact may be mentioned 
here that the industrial success of Southeast nations is based on the human factor of 
engineering excellence, to which engineering research makes a major contribution. 
Similarly, there existed an expectation that the government would also be allocating 
now higher level of resources in favour of all those priorities that the private sector 
usually neglects. But the allocations made to MIT this year appear to have again 
followed an incremental budgetary approach.  
 
Section 4. An alternate framework for an analysis of the impact of liberalisation 
on technological performance 
Coming to the issue of limitations of the theoretical framework of analysis that the 
policymakers continue to adopt to make their case for large firms, liberalization and 
deregulation, it is our understanding that the debate among both academics and 
policymakers on the policy of liberalization was and is still informed by the heroic 
conception of the origin and direction of major innovations. Within the above-
discussed contours of the academic discourse the syst mic conception of innovation 
was and is today in many cases still absent. Even today there is very little discussion 
on how the technological inter-relations and interdependence would be affected by the 
policy of liberalisation. As a result there is again not much discussion on how the role 
of the government could be shaped in respect of coordination and regulation of the 
firm level interconnections when the licensing contr ls and reservation would be 
removed.  
 
As an alternate explanation, we suggest that in a latecomer country the instruments of 
development planning have to play the role of providing for technological 
coordination to achieve the economies of scale and scope in the national system of 
innovation to alleviate the constraints of size of b th the firm as well as the market. In 
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our view, the failures that the country has particularly experienced in respect of 
technological performance on account of the implementation of liberalization are far 
better explained using the framework of analysis of the non-fulfillment of the 
requirements of technological coordination.  
 
It is the surmise of this paper that the selected policy regimes of liberalization allowed 
freedom to the Indian corporate sector to grow and develop their nexus with the 
foreign firms and finance in such a way that in many sectors it became impossible for 
the nation to achieve necessary technological coordination to realize the economies of 
scale and scope in the national system of innovation. Leaving aside a few selected 
sectors where also the corporate sector has been now allowed to capture the national 
economic space and direct the technological activity w h a myopic outlook, changes 
in the policy of licensing controls and reservation were made without any kind of 
intervention being envisaged from the side of the government in the nature of 
technological choices and the pace and orientation of capability building processes. 
As a result the nation is today experiencing a failure of technological coordination of 
the systemic dimension of the process of innovation. Similarly, in respect of the role 
of government in the articulation of demand, the inability to integrate the forces of 
S&T with the development process at the sectoral and inter-sectoral levels is in the 
case of pharmaceutical and automotive sectors evident once again from the absence of 
health and transport planning. Problems being experienced in respect of involving the 
corporate sector for the realization of the benefits of self-reliance and people oriented 
development in the economy through the processes of “ development planning” in the 
case of BT and IT are also well evident where the government has been unable to use 
the instruments of regulation and market articulation o generate appropriate domestic 
demand.  
 
Importance of the failure of technological coordinat on and market articulation has 
been analyzed in a counterfactual way for namely pharmaceuticals and automotive 
sectors. It has been shown that where the government was able to leverage the 
controls over market access to foreign companies and provide the corporate sector 
with the backward linkages it has been able to do better subsequently in terms of 
growth performance. Joseph and Parthasarthy, 2004 also seem to confirm that the new 
big business groups in the IT sector that are growing today using the route of 
outsourcing would have been seriously handicapped if the government had not 
exercised the market controls in the selected segments of electronics and 
telecommunications during the eighties.  
 
Even in the case of capital goods and machinery sector, where the domestic markets 
were protected and not open to external competition during the eighties, there is 
evidence that the Indian government had a better control over the process of 
technology imports. The selected policymakers could utilize the space to negotiate 
with the foreign companies to obtain technology in lieu of the grant of access to 
domestic market for the development of public sector in these segments. Foreign 
companies were tempted to part with their technologies in lieu of the grant of share in 
a vast domestic market. Particularly for those public sector units that were interested 
to use the grant of access of market in lieu of the acquisition of foreign technologies 
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from the technology supplier control of the governments over the domestic market did 
serve as an important tool of bargaining16.  
 
In conclusion 
Analysis undertaken in this paper of the available evidence on the patterns of 
technological accumulation and innovation clearly indicates that in spite of external 
and internal liberalization the corporate entities have not become proactive in India in 
the conduct of technological activities for the creation of new products and systems. 
The policy regimes of liberalisation, which allow the large private sector enterprises 
of both domestic and foreign origin to operate freely, have not been able to ensure the 
rate of technological accumulation to grow to a leve  to give opportunities and 
conditions to large domestic firms to become independent and capable of the 
introduction of major innovations. They are also not able to determine the directions 
of technology to move in favour of meeting the needs of the people as a whole. Be the 
experience of implementation of scientific and technological self-reliance in the 
engineering industry under market-oriented reforms during the phase of internal 
liberalization or the consequences for essential medicine production in the post-
liberalization development of pharmaceutical industry during the phase of external 
liberalization, all of these confirm that the newly selected routes of technological 
accumulation have a tendency to limit the role of Indian firms to one of unequal 
partners in the emerging international division of labour. Their technological activities 
are geared to promoting an unbridled commodification of the services and products.  
 
The strategic technological behaviour of large domestic firms is largely geared to 
promoting the integration of the local manufacturing base and other domestic 
technological facilities with the emerging patterns of global economy in an unequal 
manner. In India, under the selected path of liberalization innovations implemented by 
the large private sector firms are geared to promoting unhealthy lifestyles through the 
individualisation of consumption of cars and drugs within the Indian society rather 
than meeting the real needs. The national innovation system is moving away from the 
goals of a wider notion of competitiveness and can be today termed as highly 
negligent of the innovations that are relevant to the well being of the ‘common man 
and woman’. Its innovation capacity has become skewed and vulnerable to the 
potential technological and institutional lock-ins due to the growing integration of the 
technological plans of the corporate sector with the priorities of the western markets.  
 
However, the selected path of ‘development’ which entails both external liberalization 
and deregulation is in strategic sense a route of ch ice now for the large Indian firms. 
As far as the advocates of liberalization among the policymakers are concerned, their 
ideological rhetoric continues to be that by giving the big business total freedom to 
operate they are unleashing the big business groups to upgrade themselves 
                                               
16 For example, this did enable the Indian public sector units e.g. Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited 
(BHEL), Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL), 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT), Oil and Natural Gas 
Commission (ONGC), etc. to obtain relatively newer versions of technologies. To cite Ashok 
Parathasarthy who recently retired as a Secretary to the Government of India and has had the 
experience of negotiating with the foreign companies on behalf of the public sector units, “I have 
personally obtained many technology licenses without a single restriction in the segments of 
microelectronics and advanced computing because the gov rnment could use the grant of market 
access to the foreign companies in lieu of technology supply” (Parthasarthy Ashok, 2004). 
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technologically for the nation’s long-term benefit. More incentives are being offered 
to the corporate world to get ready to exploit the opportunities becoming available 
through the emerging growth routes. Alliance building with the foreign companies for 
the exploitation of the markets at home and abroad through the SEZs is becoming a 
key vehicle for attracting the investors to come to their states by the state 
governments, which are now competing among themselve  on the offers of 
incentives. And all of this is happening without even asking the question that whether 
actually in this way major innovation is getting stimulated and diffused to bring about 
a radical technical change in the economy. In this way with the full backing of market 
forces the dominant mainstream neo-liberal policymaking tendency today essentially 
drives the dynamics of development of national system of innovation (NSI) in India.  
 
It is also evident that small size of the domestic market came to appear as a key 
constraint for the further growth of firms originating from India. In the Indian case, 
this reason too made the Indian big business to clamour, on the one hand for the 
relaxation of restrictions put on foreign direct investment and technology imports, and 
on the other for the hastening of the process of privatization of the Indian public 
sector. Furthermore, with the dismantling of the market access controls a serious 
problem had been created in respect of the acquisition of foreign technology. 
Advanced technology cannot come with the environment of unregulated foreign direct 
investment. With the external liberalisation fully in place the main problem facing the 
acquisition of foreign technology is the loss of contr l over internal market. Domestic 
firms have lost an important bargaining tool. Not too many among domestic firms are 
in position to force the MNEs to enter into non-strategic alliances and obtain better 
technologies. The government has been willing to grant almost for asking very 
important concessions to the foreign investors. In those sectors where essentially the 
investments have been made for the location of export oriented production and R&D 
during the period of liberalisation in India, the patterns of technological accumulation 
are increasingly getting driven by the strategic behaviour of developed countries’ 
foreign firms.  
 
The process of transformation of Indian systems of innovation has been guided by the 
vision that the nation needs to implement in every sector at all levels the policy 
reforms aiming to consolidate a process of institutional transformation which 
facilitates the market confirming organizations and institutions while discouraging the 
emergence of organizations and institutions which lmit private exchange and the 
functioning of the price mechanism. The governments i  power through the media 
projected the failures experienced in respect of declining competitiveness of the 
industrial sector, stagnating incomes and growing technological obsolescence and 
economic inefficiencies, infrastructural gaps emerging in respect of energy, transport, 
communications, housing, health and education, emerging fiscal and trade imbalances 
and unemployment as their chief rationale for the implementation of the institutional 
changes linked to the process of economic liberalization. It was argued that the 
government should get out of the economy and leave it to the business groups to clear 
the mess that has arisen on account of the implementatio  of the strategy of economic 
dirigisme to obtain the targets of socio-economic development during the pre-
liberalization period. In India, it is not however difficult to realize today for anyone 
that there is a mismatch between the peoples’ aspirations and outcomes being 
achieved in respect of employment and livelihood security, energy and transport 
problems, disaster management, income distribution, linkages and synergies. 
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The patterns of integration of technological and inustrial investments that are 
emerging under the influence of the policy of liberalisation seem to be completely 
oblivious of the goals concerning non-renewable energy conservation, fuel economy, 
energy self-reliance, environmental health, water scarcity, water pollution, neglected 
diseases, human health, and such other issues. The policy regimes that are now under 
implementation are likely to drive the country towards her own people effectively 
losing their grip over the directions of innovation a d technology diffusion. Having 
been unable to develop the economies of scale and scope in the national system of 
innovation the Indian state is going to allow the corporate sector to become an integral 
part of the strategies of western firms.  
 
Finally, it is our plea that as a policy corrective only through the restoration of the role 
of technological coordination to the instruments of technological planning we can 
begin to change once again the directions of technological capability building and 
technological performance and reintegrate the Indian corporate sector into the plans of 
the Indian people. The country urgently needs an alternate direction with respect to 
the policy reforms to ensure a different kind of systemic transformation of the Indian 
innovation systems so as the policymakers can give the corporate and public sector 
alike a new strategic vision and a set of goals to work on and coordinate with each 
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